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ABSTRACT
Stop Talking about Sorrow: Nixon’s Communications Strategy after Lam Son 719
by Dominic K. So
March 1971 was tough for President Richard Nixon. The American people were tired of
the Vietnam War, with many still recovering from the violent anti-war protests of 1970.
Congress had just passed an amendment prohibiting U.S. ground troops from operating outside
of the borders of South Vietnam. Both the public and secret negotiations with Hanoi were
stalled. Confidential channels with Beijing and Moscow about diplomatic initiatives had gone
cold. Moreover, Lam Son 719, the joint U.S. and South Vietnamese incursion into Laos that
began in February, was turning out to be a failure. The operation, Nixon’s military gamble to
prove the success of Vietnamization, would show the opposite—that the South Vietnamese were
not ready to take over the fighting from the Americans.
Yet, on 7 April 1971, Nixon announced in a television address that “Vietnamization has
succeeded,” and that he would accelerate the withdrawal of American troops “because of the
achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos.” Many expected Nixon to increase the
rate of troop withdrawals no matter the outcome of Lam Son 719. However, instead of being
punished at the polls for his lack of credibility, as some in the press were predicting, in 1972,
Nixon transfixed the nation with trips to Beijing and Moscow and won re-election by 49 out of
50 states. This thesis mines archival documents from the Nixon Presidential Library, the U.S.
media, and television transcripts to explain how and why Nixon re-shaped the story of Lam Son
719 and his Vietnamization policy to persuade a dispirited American people to accept
withdrawal from Vietnam. This political comeback, often overshadowed by Watergate, provides
unique perspectives on presidential communications.
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Introduction
“While a picture doesn’t lie, a picture may not tell all the truth.” This was President
Nixon’s response to Howard K. Smith of ABC News during a television interview on 22 March
1971. Smith had asked about photos circulating in the press of South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)
soldiers hanging on the skids of U.S. Army helicopters evacuating Laos.1 By the time of this 22
March interview, that picture had come to define the joint United States-South Vietnamese
incursion into Laos in early 1971, an operation named Lam Son 719. The media narrative of Lam
Son 719, embodied by that image, involved an overwhelmed ARVN fleeing Laos by any means
possible, including desperately clinging to helicopters transporting wounded soldiers. This story
of defeat severely undercut the Nixon administration’s plan for withdrawing U.S. troops from
Vietnam “with honor” through Vietnamization, the process of turning the war over to the South
Vietnamese.2 By engineering a withdrawal from Vietnam with minimal loss to American
prestige, Nixon hoped to satisfy a war-weary American public and Congress, bury the specter of
Vietnam in the past, and move forward with other global endeavors, such as an opening of
relations with China and détente with the Soviet Union. Achieving this would require a big play.
A strike at the major North Vietnamese supply route in Laos was that big play.
Henry Kissinger later wrote of Lam Son 719 that the “operation, conceived in doubt and
assailed by skepticism, proceeded in confusion.” This mirrored the sentiment in U.S. media by
mid-March 1971 that Lam Son was a failure. Yet, on 7 April, President Nixon delivered a
television address, his only one that year regarding Vietnam, declaring, “Vietnamization has
succeeded,” and that “because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos, I
1

Richard Nixon, "A Conversation With the President," Interview With Howard K. Smith of the American
Broadcasting Company, 22 March 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency
Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/conversation-with-the-president-interview-with-howard-ksmith-the-american-broadcasting (Hereafter referred to as “Nixon, 22 March Interview”)
2
James H. Willbanks, A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 2014), 9.
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am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals.”3 To combat the image of
ARVN hanging from skids, and the associated depiction of failure, Nixon and his team spun the
story to one that better supported the administration’s goals, mainly through television
appearances by the president on 22 March and 7 April.
The open secret at this time—among the administration, the press, and even the South
Vietnamese—is that no matter what happened in Lam Son 719, Nixon would call it a success for
Vietnamization and accelerate U.S. troop withdrawals. Wall Street Journal reporters wrote on 29
March that “troop withdrawals – pegged more to political pressures in the States than to military
realities in Indochina – will doubtless continue, or even accelerate, as they probably would have
whether the Laos operation had ended in a clearcut victory or defeat.”45 Historian James
Willbanks explains that “Nixon needed Vietnamization to be a success, or at least appear to be
successful, so that he could carry through with his plan to disengage totally from the war.” In
1972, after historic trips to Beijing and Moscow, which would forever change the United States’
relationship with the world’s largest Communist powers, Nixon was re-elected by a large
margin. “Nixon to China” remains a catchphrase denoting groundbreaking foreign policy
success.6 Had Watergate not occurred, Nixon may well be regarded as one of the most successful
presidents of the twentieth century. If the press and American people generally accepted Lam

3

Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 1002. Richard Nixon,
“Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” 7 April 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-thesituation-southeast-asia-0 (Hereafter referred to as “Nixon, 7 April TV Address”)
4
Peter R. Kann and Richard J. Levine, “Assessing Laos; The Invasion Is Seen As Inconclusive Chapter In an
Inconclusive War,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 March 1971. Peter R. Kann, “Savannakhet, Laos: A Bad Place to
Visit, But a Bad Place to Live,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 March 1971.
5
Willbanks, 174.
6
Examples of recent uses in media include comparisons to President Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korean
Leader Kim Jong Un. Jeffery Lord, “Trump Goes to North Korea Is Nixon Goes To China,” The Spectator, 9 March
2018 (Accessed on 18 September 2019: https://spectator.org/trump-to-north-korea-is-nixon-goes-to-china).
Benjamin A. Engel, “The Trump-Kim Summit Is No ‘Nixon To China’ Moment,” The Diplomat, 15 March 2018
(Accessed on 18 September 2019: https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-trump-kim-summit-is-no-nixon-to-chinamoment).
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Son 719 as a failure, and if the administration’s spin was an open secret, why did it work? And,
what does this tell us about presidential communication?
By mining archival documents from the Nixon Presidential Library, the U.S. media, and
transcripts from the president’s two television appearances during this period, this thesis will
address how and why Nixon re-shaped the story of Lam Son 719 and, more generally, of his
Vietnamization policy. Ultimately, it argues that Nixon succeeded in persuading the American
people to accept withdrawal from Vietnam and focus on China and the USSR because he
correctly read the pulse of the nation. Enough people would either believe his case for
Vietnamization or just not care. Nixon told a largely dispirited public what they wanted to hear:
that the United States was leaving Vietnam. Because of other global considerations, domestic
politics, and decisions made before 1971, President Nixon planned to accelerate the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Vietnam no matter the result of Lam Son 719, and Americans accepted that.
While some Americans truly believed in Vietnamization’s success, most were simply tired of the
war and supportive of whatever means necessary to put Vietnam in the rearview.
The most recent works on Lam Son 719—James Willbanks’s A Raid Too Far and Robert
Sander’s Invasion of Laos—do not delve into this aspect of the campaign.7 A Raid Too Far adds
to sixteen other books on the Vietnam War written by Willbanks, professor emeritus at the U.S.
Army’s Command and General Staff College. Invasion of Laos is the first book for former Lam
Son helicopter pilot Sander, written to memorialize historical details of a significant life
experience. Both provide comprehensive analyses of the political decisions and military strategy
that led to the difficulties in Lam Son 719 and both consider the operation a failure, though
perhaps not “the total debacle portrayed in US media.”8 Nonetheless, Willbanks writes that

7
8

Robert D. Sander, Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam Son 719 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014).
Willbanks, 162-163.
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Nixon’s rosy assessment on television in late-March, in opposition to non-rosy media reports,
was “highly questionable.” Willbanks also characterizes both Nixon and Kissinger as “trying to
put the best face on what [they] knew had been a near disastrous performance by some units.”9
Sander’s analysis ends with the military campaign in March.
Of the works that focus on the U.S. media during this time, U.S. Army historian William
Hammond’s Public Affairs: The Military and the Media analyzes the media’s relationship with
the Nixon administration and the U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam (MACV)
during Lam Son 719 in most detail. James Landers’s The Weekly War documents the coverage of
the main U.S. weekly newsmagazines during this period. This American-centric
historiographical debate, however, continues to lack a North and South Vietnamese perspective
of the war, such as that provided by South Vietnamese Army Major-General Nguyen Duy Hinh
in Lam Son 719, and more recently by historians Ang Cheng Guan in Ending the Vietnam War
and Lien-Hang Nguyen in Hanoi’s War.10
This thesis aims to answer the question of how Nixon re-fashioned the account of Lam
Son 719 to suit his political ends. The first chapter will cover the events that led America into
Lam Son 719, including a brief history of the North Vietnamese supply route, the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. The chapter will also record Nixon’s path from his election in 1968 on a promise to end
the war to the start of Lam Son 719 in 1971. The second chapter will analyze U.S. press
coverage of Lam Son 719 from mid-March 1971, when coverage of Lam Son 719 reached its
most negative point, to 7 April 1971 when Nixon delivered his television speech. This press
9

Willbanks, 164.
William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for
Military History, 1996). James Landers, The Weekly War (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2004).
Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719: Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of
Military History, 1979); Cheng Guan Ang, Ending the Vietnam War: the Vietnamese communists’ perspective (New
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for
Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

10
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chapter will focus on three weekly newsmagazines—Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World
Report—and three newspapers—The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall
Street Journal. The thesis will then shift to the Nixon communication team’s reaction. Chapter
three will use archival documents and public comments from the administration to map their
strategy to combat the negative press coverage and decipher how their message morphed from
mid-March to 7 April in a coordinated effort to spin the public story. This chapter will focus on
two key points, President Nixon’s 22 March television interview on ABC and his 7 April
television address. Lastly, Chapter four will analyze the reasons why this strategy succeeded and
draw perspectives on presidential communication from this short period in 1971.

5

Chapter 1: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and Nixon’s Path to Lam Son 719
To understand Lam Son 719 and its significance in the context of the Vietnam War, one
must first understand its target, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The “Trail” was the North Vietnamese
Army’s (NVA) supply route running from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos. The
Vietnamese name for the Trail, the “Truong Song Strategic Supply Route,” is appropriately
named after the Truong Song, or Annamite Mountain Range, which runs north to south at the
border of the Vietnams and Laos, characterizing the Trail’s rugged mountain terrain.11 Over
years, the Trail became a “system of roads, command centers, transshipment points, base areas,
and way stations.”12 On 19 May 1959, five years after the Communist Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) asserted its independence from France and four years after western powers met
in Geneva to create South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Party Central Military Committee
instructed supply specialist Vo Bam to organize “a special military communication line to send
supplies to the revolution in the South and create conditions for its development.” By 20 August,
Hanoi completed the first successful supply mission down the Trail. In 1961, the DRV moved
the Trail slightly west, from the South Vietnamese city of Khe Sanh into the Laotian city of
Tchepone along Route 9 in response to disruption by South Vietnamese troops. In 1964, though
it meant covering greater distances, they again extended southern portions of the Trail much
further west into Laos for extra security and additional connections into South Vietnam. The area
around Tchepone remained a major stop, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South
Vietnam. This post-1964 Trail remained the structure that U.S. and South Vietnamese military
forces periodically attempted to disrupt until the fall of Saigon in 1975.
11

John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1999), xiii. Much of the information contained in the following section on the Ho Chi Minh Trail can be found in
The Blood Road, specifically on pages 9, 13, 15, 25-26, 77-78, 92-93, 95, 97, 110, 160, 221, and 268-269.
12
Willbanks, 24. Robert D. Sander also provides a history of the Laotian portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
Invasion of Laos.
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According to historian and national security analyst John Prados, the “course of the
Vietnam War became a competition between Hanoi’s efforts to create and sustain an umbilical
cord and American attempts to cut that cord or at least obstruct it.” From 1961, when the Trail
became the target of a CIA intelligence-gathering program, the United States gradually escalated
its attacks, including aerial bombing and ground combat. These increases were in conjunction
with general escalations of the Vietnam War. In December 1964, President Johnson approved
Operation Barrel Roll, a sustained air bombing campaign against northern portions of the Trail in
reaction to the communists’ attack on the American base at Bien Hoa. The next year, the U.S.
Air Force undertook multiple aerial bombing campaigns attacking the Trail.13
In March 1965, Johnson also approved cross-border ground attacks by the U.S. Army’s
clandestine “Special Operations Group” to complement the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.
Later operations in 1967 incorporated new technologies such as mud-making chemicals
(Operation Commando Lava) and artificial rainmaking (Project Compatriot). During Operation
Commando Hunt in 1968, U.S. military technicians used electronic sensors to monitor
movement patterns and tried to predict where the enemy would be at future points. Prados
likened this cat-and-mouse struggle to a pinball game and its technicians to “pinball wizards.”14
The myriad of U.S. and South Vietnamese attacks on the Trail through the 1960s,
whether by air or land, covert or overt, failed to fully disrupt the Trail. In 1968, the Communists
achieved a momentum shift with the Tet Offensive. Some argued that statistics showed Tet to be
an American victory. However, the Tet Offensive enabled Hanoi to establish full control and

13

Prados, The Blood Road, 19. Raids on the Trail in 1965 included: retaliation strikes for North Vietnamese attacks
on the U.S. base in Pleiku, Operation Steel Tiger, and Operation Tiger Hound, all in 1965. Ibid., 95, 110, 159.
14
Ibid., 97, 268-269.
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security over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in a way they never could before.15 Politically back in the
United States, the Tet Offensive also contributed to President Johnson’s withdrawal from the
race for re-election. This paved the path for Richard Nixon to win the 1968 election with the
promise of a new approach to ending the Vietnam War.
In March 1968, while on the campaign trail in New Hampshire, presidential candidate
Richard Nixon first voiced his views on the Vietnam War in public. He said that the United
States could end the war by “mobilizing our economic and political and diplomatic leadership.”
Former National Security Council (NSC) staffer Peter Rodman recalled that this
“transmogrified” into a cliché that Nixon said he had a “secret plan” to end the war. Nixon wrote
in his memoirs that he would never have said that he had a plan, let alone a secret plan, but that
he “believed that we were not making adequate use of our vast diplomatic resources and powers”
and that the solution was in Peking and Moscow rather than in Hanoi.16 Nixon’s thinking behind
the vagueness, which led to the “secret plan” criticisms, is questionable. Still, Nixon began his
first term in office with an American public counting on him to end the war.
After Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made his first visit to South Vietnam in March
1969, he returned with optimism about ARVN capabilities and argued that the American mission
should focus on strengthening the ARVN to take over more of the wartime nation’s security.
This would allow for further U.S. troop withdrawals. Nixon would write later that the
undertaking of Vietnamization, the term Laird coined for this policy, was “another turning point
in my administration’s Vietnam strategy.”17 In actuality, this idea to “strengthen the Saigon
15

The U.S. abandonment of their base at Khe Sanh, located very close to the border between Laos and South
Vietnam, marked a significant military win for Hanoi. Prados writes that this helped to “clear the flanks of the
Trail.” Ibid., 283.
16
Conrad Black, Richard Nixon: A Life in Full (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 516. Peter W. Rodman, More
Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1994), 124. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1978), 298.
17
Nixon, RN, 392.
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forces and begin unilateral withdrawals of U.S. troops while negotiating” was not that different
from what the Johnson Administration had been attempting for years. Nonetheless,
Vietnamization provided the rationale for which Nixon was searching to withdraw U.S. troops.18
By October 1969, the American public was losing patience with the new administration’s
lack of progress on the war. The anti-war movement was becoming increasingly vocal.
Newsweek’s headline for its 13 October issue illustratively read, “Nixon in Trouble.”19 The
administration had been in power for over nine months and even Nixon admitted, “No progress
whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.” On 3
November, the president delivered a television address soon dubbed the “Silent Majority
Speech.” In the speech, Nixon revealed the offers that the United States had made toward the
North Vietnamese, including his secret personal letter to Ho Chi Minh, and argued that it was the
North Vietnamese who were unwilling to compromise. He gave reasons why an immediate,
unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops would be dangerous, and argued the merits of
Vietnamization and diplomacy with other Communist powers, factors that could sway the DRV.
He also called those citizens who disagreed with his plan a “vocal minority,” and ended the
speech with an appeal to the “silent majority” of Americans for their support. A Gallup poll
showed that Nixon’s approval rating increased from 56 to 67 percent right after the speech.20
However, this political momentum would last no more than six months.
In April 1970, Nixon approved a joint U.S.-ARVN incursion into Cambodia to attack
NVA sanctuaries as well as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), “the headquarters
18

Prados, The Blood Road, 289. Willbanks, 10.
Black, 641.
20
President Nixon used the “shape of the bargaining table” line in the Silent Majority Speech. Richard Nixon,
“Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” 3 November 1969. Online by the Richard Nixon Presidential
Library and Museum, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/silentmajority_transcript.pdf. David
Coleman, “Nixon’s Presidential Approval Ratings,” History in Pieces, accessed on 20 October 2019
https://historyinpieces.com/research/nixon-approval-ratings.
19
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for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Nixon further explained in his
30 April television address that this operation would “protect our men who are in Vietnam and to
guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs.”21 The U.S.
Air Force had been covertly bombing Cambodia since 1969 with little effect on stopping supply
traffic, but this was the first ground offensive into Cambodia. While President Nixon announced
that Cambodia was “the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war,” scholars
continue to debate the military outcome of this incursion. Some consider 1970 to be the high
point of Vietnamization and U.S. achievement in the Vietnam War. Others note Nixon’s
convenient omission of the failed search for COSVN in later remarks and question the numbers
of enemies killed and supplies captured as touted by the administration as measures of success.22
Regardless of military victory or failure, the Cambodian incursion ignited a political bomb
domestically, eroding any positive sentiment Nixon gained from the Silent Majority speech.23
Protests spread across universities in the United States and on 4 May 1970, violence
between students and National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Ohio resulted in killing
deaths and nine injuries. Ten days later, police killed two protestors and injured twelve during a
clash at Jackson State College in Mississippi. Historian Gregory Daddis writes, “The violence

21

Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” 30 April 1970. Online by the
University of Virginia Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-30-1970address-nation-situation-southeast-asia (hereafter, Nixon, 30 April TV address).
22
Lewis Sorley writes, “The raid into Cambodia probably had – at this late date in the war, and given the limitations
placed on it – only ephemeral effect,” but later argues that the “war was won” in late 1970. Lewis Sorley, A Better
War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace
& Company, 1999), 213 and 217. On the more critical side, Gregory Daddis argues in 2011 that “the incursion was
not in fact a success by any rational standard of judgment,” and in 2017 that “Nixon’s decision to expand the war
into Cambodia appeared the embodiment of unintended (and horrific) consequences.” Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure
Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford UP, 2011), 211.
Gregory A. Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (New York: Oxford UP, 2017),
130. Others, such as Melvin Small and Andrew Wiest, acknowledge that the operation may have successfully
delayed large-scale NVA attacks, but remain critical of claims of success. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard
Nixon (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 81. Andrew Wiest, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism
and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 198.
23
Willbanks, 20. Black, 668-670.
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and social unrest on the nation’s college campuses, in fact, underscored the interlocking nature of
the war in Southeast Asia and the turbulent American home front in the late 1960s and early
1970s.”24 Concurrent with this backlash against the administration within academic institutions
was another within Congress.
A month after the incident at Kent State, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution proposed by
Kentucky Republican John Sherman Cooper and Idaho Democrat Frank Church that would cut
funding for U.S. ground troops in Cambodia and Laos starting 30 June 1970.25 This did not pass
the House of Representatives at the time. However, Congress passed a diluted version that
prohibited any U.S. ground troops outside of South Vietnam in January 1971. This restriction
significantly altered how Lam Son 719 was fought. In addition, the Cooper-Church Amendment
signaled the beginning of Congress taking steps to regain power from the executive branch to
end the war.
While all of these events were occurring, Henry Kissinger had been holding periodic
negotiations with the DRV in secret since 1969. These were convened in parallel to the public
peace negotiations in Paris headed by former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot
Lodge. On 7 September 1970, as usual, Kissinger met North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy
at a simple house in the Parisian suburbs. Kissinger pressed for a negotiated settlement, using the
threat that the South Vietnamese were only getting stronger with time. Over the next few
months, Hanoi would publicly reject entreaties from the United States, including a 7 October
speech from President Nixon offering: a cease-fire, a peace conference, the negotiation of a
timetable for total U.S. troop withdrawal, a political settlement for South Vietnam, and the
mutual release of prisoners-of-war. Believing that nothing short of unilateral U.S. withdrawal

24
25

Daddis, Withdrawal, 129.
Black, 680.
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from South Vietnam would appease the North Vietnamese, Kissinger recalled that he and Nixon
pursued a strategy of “three concurrent efforts until Saigon could stand on its own feet:
American troop withdrawals, the rapid strengthening of South Vietnamese forces; and the
progressive weakening of the enemy.”26 It is under this context that Nixon embarked upon
Operation Lam Son 719.
By late 1970, Nixon wanted a big play to force the DRV to negotiate a truce, prove
Vietnamization was working, and accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Cambodian
incursion drained DRV resources but not enough. Time was not on Nixon’s side. Due to the
president’s April 1970 troop withdrawal promise and Congressional pressure on the military
budget, MACV would lose another 60,000 troops by May 1971. Coupled with time windows
dependent on monsoon seasons, this last play had to be conducted before May 1971.27 With the
“when” decided, it was now a question of “where.”28
The exact origin of the plan to attack the NVA in Laos remains unclear. Due to the
operation’s eventual failure, many of the decision-makers avoided responsibility after the fact.
Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Vietnamese later blamed General Creighton Abrams, MACV’s
commander. However, Abrams’ predecessor, General Westmoreland, proposed a similar plot
four years earlier, which the Johnson White House abandoned. ARVN leaders had been
proposing a similar attack since 1965. Abrams scholar Lewis Sorley describes Lam Son 719 as
“stimulated by Washington, transmitted by McCain and Abrams, and sketched out by Thieu.”
26

Kissinger detailed in his memoirs that Hanoi would undercut any progress in the secret negotiations with public
statements. As an example, Kissinger’s 7 September conversation with Xuan Thuy about the terms of a negotiated
settlement was undercut by Hanoi’s issuance of “Madame Binh’s Eight-Point Peace Plan” ten days later, without
any prior warning to Kissinger. Kissinger, White House Years, 976-981, 986.
27
Willbanks, 29.
28
Lam Son 719 would be the first public invasion of Laos supported by the United States. However, the U.S. had
been running covert operations in Laos since the Johnson Administration. By 1971, these operations were overseen
by the “40 Committee,” chaired by Henry Kissinger. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume
VII, Vietnam, July 1970 - January 1972, eds. David Goldman, Erin Mahan, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 2010) (hereafter, FRUS, Volume VII), Document 172.
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John Prados explains, “The White House maneuvered to have Saigon take responsibility for what
it wanted, both to stymie opponents and to avoid blame if things went wrong.” Post-operation
finger pointing notwithstanding, it is likely that Nixon and Kissinger were the geneses.
Eventually, the Pentagon devised the plan and communicated the idea to decision-makers in
South Vietnam, including MACV, the U.S. Embassy, and the South Vietnamese. All the while,
the White House actively tried to make it appear like a Vietnamese idea.29
The resulting plan was to be conducted in four phases over three months. During Phase
One—also called Dewey Canyon II to confuse the enemy by using codenames from an older
operation—U.S. ground troops would secure Route 9 on the South Vietnamese side, from Khe
Sanh to the Laotian border. This American-led phase would secure the area for ARVN ground
troops and U.S. support troops to gather for the next phase. In Phase Two, ARVN troops, with
U.S. air support, would cross into Laos, and proceed 42 kilometers up Route 9 to Tchepone, an
important North Vietnamese base in Laos that had been the target of American policymakers
since 1960.30 The ARVN would set up firebases along the route as they progressed. During
Phase Three, ARVN would maintain control of Tchepone while conducting search-and-destroy
missions along Trail routes surrounding Tchepone. Phase Four would be a withdrawal back to
South Vietnam through a different route, going southeast through the A Shau Valley. The
operation, named Lam Son 719 after the birthplace of a fifteenth-century Vietnamese hero,
would be run by the South Vietnamese with support from the Americans. The objective was to
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block the enemy’s flow of supplies and destroy stockpiles and facilities.31 Unfortunately for the
Americans and South Vietnamese, the operation did not go as planned.
Phase One began on 30 January 1971 and the ARVN crossed the border into Laos to
begin Phase Two on 8 February. However, just a few days into the march up Route 9 towards
Tchepone, the South Vietnamese became overwhelmed and the operation bogged down. Phases
Three and Four would not be executed as planned. This was due to a combination of intelligence
leaks, divergent goals between Nixon and Thieu, leadership failures in the upper ARVN
echelons, poor weather delaying American air support, insufficient air support, as well as other
factors. Encountering stiff resistance from the enemy, the column of ARVN soldiers stalled on
Route 9 for weeks, giving the NVA time to regroup. By 20 February, some ARVN soldiers
began retreating from their firebases in Laos.32
Journalist Henry Kamm wrote in a 30 January 1990 New York Times article, “Tchepone
became to many American and South Vietnamese military leaders what Moby Dick was to
Captain Ahab – the object of an obsessive, destructive quest.”33 In early March 1971, the ARVN
made another push and eventually “captured” Tchepone on 8 March, a Pyrrhic victory as the
NVA had abandoned the city. The ARVN left almost as soon as they entered.34 By mid-March,
only one month after first crossing into Laos, the South Vietnamese began their retreat. While
most ARVN soldiers returned to South Vietnam on foot or aboard armored vehicles, the only
way to evacuate some ARVN soldiers from Laotian bases was through U.S. helicopters. As
helicopters arrived to pick up the wounded, some unwounded ARVN soldiers “panicked,” to use
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Nixon’s characterization, and were photographed desperately clinging to helicopter skids.35 This
enduring image, and the associated depiction of the ARVN as cowardly, dominated U.S. press
coverage of Lam Son 719 from 18 March onwards.36 Traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail increased
again shortly after the conclusion of Operation Lam Son 719.37
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Chapter 2: Press Coverage of Lam Son 719
“Our worst enemy seems to be the press.”38 President Nixon’s well-documented and
tumultuous relationship with the press, as exemplified by this comment to Henry Kissinger in
early March of 1971, began before Nixon became president and never improved. Journalist Jack
Anderson claimed that Nixon’s animosity towards the press dated back to his days as a
congressman in the 1940s. Nixon blamed his 1960 presidential election loss to Kennedy on
Anderson’s revelation of a loan from businessman Howard Hughes to Nixon’s brother.39 This
hostility carried over to members of Nixon’s cabinet. Referring to Henry Kissinger and Secretary
of State William Rogers during the late 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan, Anderson
wrote that they “deliberately misled the reporters they saw…they lied because the President
wanted them to lie.”40 During Lam Son 719, this long-standing battle between the president and
the media was exacerbated by policies, personalities, and a history distinct to the Nixon
Administration.
On 29 January 1971, the day before beginning Phase One of the operation, MACV
instituted a press embargo.41 The ban prohibited journalists from reporting on any actions in
38
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Military Region I, the northernmost of South Vietnam’s four military regions, which included all
of Lam Son 719’s operational areas.42 The only information cleared for publication was that
provided by the MACV press office in a daily press statement. In a sign of MACV’s
hypersensitivity to press leaks, a military spokesman’s 29 January statement explaining the
embargo clarified that the restriction covered the statement itself. Nonetheless, the embargo did
not last long. On 1 February, the New York Times reprinted a story from the London Observer
that violated the embargo by reporting on MACV’s background briefing and speculating about
an upcoming invasion into Laos.43 Rather than prevent leaks about the upcoming invasion, the
policy appeared to have only further upset members of the media who felt the blackout was
unjustified. MACV eventually lifted the embargo on 4 February. William Hammond speculates
that it may have been the “bad blood” festering for months between MACV and the press which
caused Abrams to hold the embargo for that long, despite General Abrams’ statements to the
contrary. MACV was also contending with an order from the president to quietly restrict
reporters’ access to military helicopters.44 This hostile environment would set the tone for press
coverage of Operation Lam Son 719.
In 1971, the combined circulation of United States newspapers that year reached over 62
million per day. Many articles were shared across papers, as the Associated Press and United
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Press International supplied stories to 1,750 American newspapers daily. The three television
stations on the air at the time—NBC, ABC, and CBS—reached 51 million viewers per night. The
most popular weeklies— Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report—reached 38 million
readers per week. Radio news reached 9 million listeners per day.45 As a representation of the
media landscape from mid-March to 7 April 1971, this thesis will explore in detail the three most
popular weeklies—Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News—and three highly-circulated newspapers—
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal—with the aim of
tracking press coverage of Lam Son 719.
Of the three weeklies, political scientist Lori Cox Han describes Time and Newsweek as
“among the top targets for what the White House considered their ‘Eastern establishment,’
traditionally Democratic, bias.”46 Throughout four issues, from 15 March to 5 April, both Time
and Newsweek initially remained neutral on Lam Son 719 and highlighted the heroism of U.S.
forces. By 29 March, however, both weeklies had become negative about Lam Son 719 and
vocal about the administration’s soured relationship with the press. Criticism of the
administration, though, permeated throughout.
With Lam Son 719 still in progress, the 15 March issue of Time withheld judgment on the
operation and its effect on the U.S. withdrawal. In its regular section titled “The Nation,” Time’s
journalists wrote, “perhaps, just perhaps, the U.S. may be able to pull off not only a successful
withdrawal from Indochina but some form of victory as well…. The President had a valid point
when he warned against too-quick judgments on Laos.” In the same issue, the weekly noted that
truck movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail had been halved thanks to Lam Son but due to
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questions surrounding U.S. air support, victory “remains to be seen.”47 The 22 March issue was
less optimistic about Lam Son 719, noting that traffic on the Trail had returned to normal.48 The
article also called Lam Son “dispiriting” for the ARVN.49 Time acknowledged the toll the
operation must have taken on the NVA in their coverage of Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai’s trip
to Hanoi. In an article titled “Killing Is Our Business and Business Is Good,” Time
correspondents wrote flattering descriptions of U.S. Army helicopter pilots while mentioning
less-than-heroic actions by ARVN troops.50
By 29 March, Time’s reporters were calling Lam Son 719 a retreat. A 29 March article,
“Laos: The Bloody Battle to Get Out,” referred to ARVN soldiers clinging to helicopter skids in
retreat and quoted a U.S. soldier referring to the ARVN with sarcasm, “Here come the victors.”
The same article explained that of the 500 men in the ARVN’s 4th battalion who entered Laos,
only 32 survived, of which one-third were wounded. In another offering titled “Was It Worth
It?” Time’s authors predicted Lam Son’s failure to achieve the goals of delaying NVA
47
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offensives, proving Vietnamization, building ARVN morale, and building political support for
Thieu and Nixon. This 29 March issue also addressed a shift in White House communications
strategy to push the president’s “human side.” 51 The narrative of a bloody ARVN retreat
pervaded Time’s 5 April issue. A photo of an ARVN soldier hanging onto a helicopter skid
appeared in an article titled “Again, the Credibility Gap?” Reporters called ARVN losses
“numbing” and wrote that results for Vietnamization were “both encouraging and dismaying.”
The increasing animosity between the White House and the press also featured in the issue. Time
staff supported the president of NBC’s letter to all members of Congress condemning the
administration’s discrediting and intimidation of news organizations, as well as NBC news
anchor John Chancellor’s rare on-air rebuke of the administration. Responding to Nixon’s
allegations during his 22 March television interview of biased coverage of Lam Son 719, Time’s
writers argued, “Almost no reporters…were permitted to cover the operation inside Laos
anyhow, so the President in effect was criticizing the press for not entirely accepting the official
version of the story.”52
Newsweek’s coverage from 15 March to 7 April largely mirrored that of Time. Its 15
March cover story, “The Helicopter War,” consisted of articles presenting U.S. pilots in a heroic
light. Joseph Morgenstern profiled Sgt. Dennis Fujii, who gave up his helicopter seat to a
wounded ARVN and called airstrikes from Laos. Another correspondent, who experienced a
rescue first-hand, highlighted a unit nicknamed the “Comancheros.” Another journalist agreed
with Nixon that “the jury is still out” on Laos, but stressed that the two main issues in the
president’s 1972 re-election bid will be the Vietnam War and domestic economics. However, the
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15 March issue also included critiques of Henry Kissinger’s seemingly singular control over
foreign policy and of a Pentagon briefing on Lam Son 719, during which a spokesman displayed
a pipe that turned out to be from a previous operation.53 Newsweek’s 22 March issue also began
raising questions about Lam Son 719. In their coverage of Premier Zhou En Lai’s trip to Hanoi,
Newsweek reporters stressed the NVA’s “infinite capacity for pain.”54
By 29 March, Newsweek also used the term “retreat.” An article titled “Slugging It Out”
noted that “When the fighting died down, the ARVN troops seemed to be scurrying back toward
their own border…it seemed more like a plain old-fashioned retreat.” The rest of the 29 March
issue included pieces on the troubles awaiting Vietnam veterans upon their return home, the
dilapidated state of the ARVN’s choppers that may have led to the death of Newsweek’s
correspondent Francois Sully, and an opinion piece about the necessity of the draft.55 By 5 April,
correspondents wrote of “a bitter new pass” in relations between the White House and the press.
In an article titled “A Bleak Week for Richard Nixon,” journalists wrote that Lam Son 719’s
“public imagery was irrevocably set by…the reports of decimated South Vietnamese units falling
raggedly back under blistering enemy fire, of panicky ARVN soldiers clinging desperately to the
skids of outbound U.S. helicopters, [and] of casualties estimated officially at 25 per cent and
unofficially at up to 50.” By this time, the publication’s staff believed that “whether or not [Lam
Son 719] is ultimately considered a success, the President has little choice but to act as though it
were a triumph.” Addressing Nixon’s statement that he had never directly contacted media
members to complain, Newsweek editors responded that while the president may not have made
53
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direct contact, “the fusillades directed by Mr. Nixon’s surrogates against TV journalism last
week represented the most concerted attack on media since Vice President Spiro Agnew’s
celebrated Des Moines speech seventeen months ago.”56
U.S. News, a conservative publication that the White House viewed as “favorable to the
administration,” published fewer total articles about Lam Son 719 and the Vietnam War in their
issues from 15 March to 7 April as compared to Time and Newsweek.57 The articles that U.S.
News did publish took a positive or at least neutral tone towards Lam Son and the administration,
often including direct quotes from administration officials. While the topics and tone of U.S.
News’s 15 March issue on Laos were similar to those of Time and Newsweek that week, U.S.
News’s coverage would subsequently diverge from the other two weeklies. The author of
“Struggle in Laos – Biggest Test Yet for South Vietnam,” wrote a neutral assessment of Lam
Son 719: “So far the picture from Laos is mixed: not the smashing victory optimists were
looking for – but not the defeat some pessimists were predicting.” U.S. News’s journalists also
noted the infighting between Kissinger, Rogers, and Laird.58 However, in the following weeks,
U.S. News would remain either supportive of the administration, or silent on the war, as
compared to the other two weeklies.
Unlike in Time and Newsweek where Lam Son 719 dominated coverage on 22 March and
29 March, there was almost no mention of the operation in U.S. News within those issues. The 22
March publication included one small reference to the Senate’s discussions about “limiting the
56
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President’s warmaking powers.”59 The following week’s release discussed Secretary Rogers’
ease with numbers and place names in Laos during a recent press conference, which supposedly
showed that “Kissinger is not the only man in town who is familiar with foreign affairs.” That
issue also predicted, incorrectly, that “war headlines will get less prominence” as the ARVN
move out of Laos in the weeks ahead. Other articles covered a survey of Americans’ feelings
about the Vietnam War and addressed problems facing Vietnam veterans.60
U.S. News’s 5 April issue devoted much more coverage to Laos and the war. An
interview with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, consisted mainly
of administration talking points. In “Balance Sheet on Laos – Victory or Defeat,” the writer
argued, “Results fell far short of the ‘big victory’ that was hoped for, but were far from the
‘defeat’ Hanoi is claiming.” “President Nixon is now in a position, as a result of the Laos
incursion, to announce in mid-April a fresh withdrawal of American ground troops from South
Vietnam,” the author concluded. The article also depicted ARVN performance as “mixed but
basically encouraging to Saigon,” and quoted a U.S. military officer as saying, “Saigon has
scored a partial success – but an expensive one.” Of note is the article’s photo: ARVN orderly
awaiting a helicopter pickup, as opposed to hanging on helicopter skids.61
Newspaper coverage from 18 March to 7 April generally echoed that of Time and
Newsweek, starting with more measured assessments before becoming more critical of the
Laotian operation and the Nixon administration. On 18 March, the New York Times, The
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal all devoted front-page articles to Lam Son 719
59
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and all took a neutral view.62 Among the three publications, the Times took a slightly negative
tone in its initial coverage and became decidedly negative around 22 March, which is seen most
markedly in Saigon Bureau Chief Alvin Shuster’s articles. The Post remained more neutral in the
operation’s first week, bifurcated into staunchly pro-administration and anti-administration
articles the second week, before returning to a neutral position by the third week. The Journal
devoted the least amount of coverage to Lam Son 719, though what it did write was negative.63
Most of its reporting on Laos during this period consisted of one paragraph per day in its frontpage “What’s News” summary section. Considering the Nixon administration’s lumping of the
Times and Post into their “Eastern Establishment” list along with Time and Newsweek, it is
surprising that the Post devoted considerable space to official statements while the Journal did
not hold back on criticisms.64
The New York Times generally trended negatively compared to the other two papers but
became much more critical beginning on 22 March. Coverage on or before 21 March
acknowledged the difficulties that the ARVN faced and the incongruity between battlefield
accounts and official statements. However, Times authors refrained from judging the operation a
failure. On 18 March, although the Times published a photo of an ARVN soldier hanging onto a
U.S. helicopter skid and called him a “hitchhiker,” the article retained its objectivity and called
the situation a “pull out.” In that same issue, Alvin Shuster called the fighting “bitter” and quoted
a South Vietnamese “associate” of President Thieu as saying that “Nixon will be able to claim it
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was all a success and thus American boys can go home sooner.”65 Around the same time, James
Naughton quoted Vice President Agnew as calling Lam Son “an orderly retreat,” and another
journalist quoted Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim as saying that the operation was going
“according to plan.”66 Robert B. Semple wrote about this diverging narrative on 19 March:
“Caught between the optimistic comments by the Administration, and the pessimistic but
fragmentary details from the field, many observers…conceded uncertainty about the course of
the Laotian operation.” By 21 March, Shuster was still asking whether Lam Son 719 was “a
triumph or a trap.”67
The next day, however, after 2,000 more ARVN troops returned from Laos, Shuster
wrote that the “withdrawal…seemed to observers here to come earlier than expected, because of
the relentless enemy opposition.” He called Saigon’s latest estimate of captured munitions
“questionable at best.”68 By 24 March, the bureau chief used the words “losers” and “defeated,”
though qualifying the terms, while another article slammed Nixon’s “credibility gap.”69 In an
article that prompted General Abrams to write an explanatory memo to the White House, Gloria
Emerson quoted an ARVN corporal as saying, “The papers and the radio in Saigon kept on
saying there was a Laos victory, I have learned now, but what a joke…. We ran out like
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wounded dogs.”70 In the following days, criticism of the operation turned toward the
administration. In a “letter to the editor” published on 27 March, one reader predicted that if
Nixon tried to call Lam Son a success, he would lose re-election.71 On 28 March, James Reston,
one of the president’s “bad guys,” wrote that Nixon’s “main problem is not with his personality
or with the press, formidable as these problems are, but with his policies on the war and the
economy.”72 That same day, Alvin Shuster saw “no doubt here that the President would have
proceeded with the withdrawals no matter what happened in Laos. Politically, he would seem to
have no choice.”73
This criticism of the administration would also lead to criticisms of Vietnamization. On 5
April, Anthony Lewis wrote in the Times that the lesson of Laos was that “Vietnamization is
now seen to have limited possibilities.” The next day, Don Luce contended that a negotiated
political compromise was the only solution that could end the war, while an editorial argued,
“Continued claims of success for the Laotian invasion and the Vietnamization program – and the
contradictory policy of seeking military victory while American troops are withdrawing – will
only tempt the South Vietnamese further down the path to disaster and intensify the highly
emotional divisions at home.”74
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In mid-March, similar to the Times’ coverage, The Washington Post also withheld
judgment of the operation. Correspondents acknowledged the difficulties in balancing anecdotal
accounts from the front with official statements from Saigon and Washington. A front-page
article on 18 March quoted a U.S. helicopter pilot as saying, “from where I’m flying there’s only
one way to describe it [the ARVN withdrawal from Laos] – retreat, and a bad one.” The same
article quoted a South Vietnamese spokesman who argued that the move was “tactical,” and
repeated Pentagon spokesman Friedheim’s statement that the operation was proceeding
“according to plan.”75 The following day, Post correspondent Peter Jay seemed unprepared to
make a final assessment. “At this point, it seems likely that no real evaluation of Lam Son
719…will be possible until well after the operation is over and the troops have been
withdrawn.”76
During the week from 21 to 28 March, the tone of articles in the Post diverged markedly
into two camps: pro- and anti-administration. Leading the pro-Lam Son/administration camp was
conservative columnist Joseph Alsop. On 22 March, Alsop argued that the “reasons for Saigon’s
decision to begin withdrawal are both obvious and sound.” Two days later, when many were
questioning the retreat, he still declared that “optimism is in order.” On 26 March, Alsop
defended Nixon and questioned the media’s propagation of a “credibility gap.”77 Though not as
supportive as Alsop, Jack Foisie still called the situation an “orderly withdrawal” in a 24 March
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article, while the day before, Chalmers Roberts and Peter Jay both gave the official version of
events by quoting directly from Nixon’s ABC television interview and ARVN briefers.78
In direct contrast to Alsop, another Nixon “bad guy,” Joseph Kraft, led the Post’s antiLam Son/administration camp. “It is more than ever doubtful,” he wrote on 21 March, “that the
South Vietnamese can defend themselves without substantial American help.”79 Two days later,
Kraft criticized Nixon’s escalation of the war while claiming to accelerate withdrawals. “With
the goal of getting out proclaimed, there is no credible logic for expanding military activities….
The President can no longer take the country in tow on Vietnam simply by saying Forward
March.”80 Peter Osnos, Peter Jay, and Chalmers Roberts each wrote pieces at the month’s end
criticizing the ARVN’s retreat from Laos and describing the Nixon administration’s
difficulties.81
However, from 29 March to 7 April, the Post’s coverage returned to the neutral center.
Most articles about Lam Son 719 tended to analyze the administration’s next steps with the
perspective of political realities. On 29 March, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak believed it
was “impossible to offset highly emotionalized accounts of the fighting that dominate the media
with immediate evidence of military success.”82 On 1 April, David Broder offered his pragmatic
take: “If South Vietnam can get through this year with its territory relatively secure, and if Mr.
Thieu can be re-elected in a relatively honest election, then the stage would be set for Mr. Nixon
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to adopt George Aiken’s long-standing advice to ‘declare victory and get out.’”83 On 5 April,
Marquis Childs claimed that the “objectives of the Laos operation were 75 to 80 per cent
achieved.” Childs also provided some insight into the administration’s plan for the 7 April
address, writing that the president’s advisors “know the country is being torn apart not only by
the war but by all the dire events of the decade of the ‘60s.”84
Although the Wall Street Journal had the least coverage of Lam Son 719 among the three
papers, the articles it did publish from 18 March to 7 April were negative about the operation and
remained so throughout the period. Peter Kann struck a measured tone for his front-page story on
18 March. “Despite the ARVN retreats of recent days, military officials in Vietnam believe they
already have seriously disrupted the North Vietnamese army supply line and thus the enemy’s
future plans.” Writers of the Journal’s “What’s News” section on 19 March labeled the operation
a “retreat” and the issue’s “Washington Wire” section predicted the “results in Laos will be less
than Washington wanted, though officials will claim successes.” On 24 March, Robert Keatley
questioned the White House’s official statements and assumptions but wrote that the White
House “seems honestly to believe” in Vietnamization and value of Lam Son 719.85
On 26 March, John Pierson attributed Nixon’s public optimism to either a lie to “disguise
real uneasiness,” or the White House being “isolated from reality.” Three days later, Peter Kann
and Richard Levine questioned the administration’s motives. “Troop withdrawals – pegged more
to political pressures in the States than to military realities in Indochina – will doubtless
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continue, or even accelerate, as they probably would have whether the Laos operation had ended
in a clearcut victory or defeat.”86
During this period, the Journal devoted significant space to covering political challenges
to Nixon’s policies, such as calls by Democratic Senators Mike Mansfield and Ted Kennedy to
end the war, as well as Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey’s demands for transparency
during his trip to Vietnam.87 Other articles discussed the shift in domestic political sentiment
with the failure of Laos. Norman Miller quoted a Democratic congressman on 31 March, who
argued that “people are just too angry about the war for there to be a political risk in opposing
the President.” Quoting another congressman, Miller continued, “There’s an increasing demand
to get out of Vietnam regardless of the consequences.”88 The Journal’s 7 April “What’s News”
summary, published the morning of Nixon’s television address, read, “There has been a swelling
of sentiment in Congress to name a date for total withdrawal, and polls have shown Nixon’s
popularity slipping.”89
While a few publications, such as U.S. News and The Chicago Tribune, were more
supportive of the administration’s claims of success in Lam Son 719, most other print and
television media mirrored the negativity represented in Time, Newsweek, The New York Times,
The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal.90 Even with restrictions imposed, journalists
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found their way around them, such as Japanese photographer Akihiko Okamura on assignment
with Life, who snuck into Laos for two weeks with ARVN troops. The resulting images and
reporting, because of their scarcity, garnered attention and exacerbated the negative coverage.91
Television coverage often was more negative than print media. The high-profile spat
between NBC and the White House in early April 1971, culminating in NBC President Julian
Goodman’s letter to all members of Congress condemning the administration’s intimidation of
news organizations and NBC news anchor John Chancellor’s unprecedented on-air criticism of
the administration, epitomized this fractured relationship. The acrimony extended to other
networks as well, such as when Vice President Agnew, on behalf of the administration, attacked
CBS for their documentary “The Selling of the Pentagon,” which exposed the Pentagon’s public
affairs budget and activities.92 For an administration that already distrusted the media, the press’s
negativity towards the Laos operation appeared to be spoiling a success for Vietnamization and
required a proactive response.
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Chapter 3: The White House Response to Negativity towards Lam Son 719
While the White House dealt with other competing international and domestic issues
between 18 March and 7 April, Lam Son 719 remained at the forefront.93 Also, President Nixon
took the systematic tracking of and response to media to an unprecedented level. Political
scientist Lori Cox Han notes how the Nixon administration was the first to open a White House
Communications Office, separate from the Press Office, to deal with long-term strategies. It was
also the first administration to produce daily news summaries. “For better or worse,” Han points
out, “Nixon’s advisors changed the way that the White House attempted to manage the image of
the president as well as manage the press.”94 In one such news summary from 18 March, White
House staff flagged an unflattering article from syndicated columnist and prominent member of
the White House “Bad Guys List” James Reston in the Detroit Free Press. The president
underlined a quote on the summary, “Nixon invaded Laos without a single word to the American
people” and wrote a note to Henry Kissinger that Reston “should be nailed for this. Didn’t he
object to ‘rhetoric’ of Cambodia?”95 Nixon closely tracked domestic media down to individual
journalists, and directed staff to take specific, targeted action in response.
By mid-March, the White House communications team became well aware of the
increasingly negative press coverage of Lam Son 719. NSC staff described media reports as
“gloomy and loud” and emotions at the White House as “widespread nervousness.”96 The
administration had already begun promoting positive assessments of the situation in Laos among
93
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Cabinet officials and Members of Congress.97 The increasingly antagonistic relationship between
the administration and the press, which peaked during Lam Son, had escalated to the point where
Nixon, Kissinger, and other staff were blaming the press for an anti-administration, even antiAmerican, bias. During a 17 March telephone conversation, President Nixon fumed over “these
smart son-of-a-bitching reporters. I really think some of them are trying to serve Hanoi now.”
Kissinger agreed. “I believe they have a vested interest in our losing.”98 During another phone
call with Kissinger two days later, Nixon retained his anger. “The press is panting so that they
can make it [Lam Son 719] into a defeat.”99 For the administration, negative coverage of Lam
Son was yet another example of the liberal press’s anti-Nixon bias, to which they had to respond
with strength.100
With negative reports streaming in, Nixon and Kissinger sent Deputy National Security
Advisor Alexander Haig to South Vietnam from 14 to 21 March to get a first-hand read of the
situation. Publicly, Kissinger wrote to Ambassador Bunker that the reason for the trip was “to
provide a general assessment of the situation in Southeast Asia and to obtain [Bunker’s] views
on a number of long range issues.” Privately, Nixon was considering firing Abrams, possibly
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even replacing him with Haig.101 In his memoirs, Haig recalls two main conclusions based on his
trip: “First, the South Vietnamese troops, though in some cases poorly led by their higherranking officers, had fought bravely and performed well. Second, U.S. fire support and close air
support had been inadequate.... This resulted in casualty rates among South Vietnamese troops
that no American commander would have countenanced.” Kissinger later described Haig’s trip
as putting “an end to all illusions” that the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces could still turn Lam
Son into a success.102
Upon arriving in Saigon, Haig met with Bunker and Abrams. His conversations with the
ambassador and MACV commander included a maximum troop withdrawal number, guarding
against leaks, and a possible meeting between Nixon and Thieu in July. Haig described Bunker
as “enthusiastic and confident.”103 After returning from a day-trip to Cambodia, Haig visited I
Corps, the one was responsible for Lam Son 719 of the ARVN’s four corps. This visit to the
front convinced Haig that the best the United States could hope for by this point in the operation
was an orderly withdrawal to avoid a complete failure. He reported that “ARVN enthusiasm for
[the] continuation of Lam Son 719 is completely lacking” and apologized to Kissinger that he
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could not give a “more encouraging report.”104 Haig’s meeting with President Thieu the next day
appeared less pessimistic “I do not feel we need to be in the least defensive about Lam Son 719,”
Haig reported back home. “It has achieved most of what we had hoped for and those involved
here all are confident that it was well worth the price of admission – albeit a high one.” Thieu
explained that his modifications to the original plan were due to the unexpected strength of the
NVA and the ARVN’s heavy losses, and bemoaned “the great amount of pessimistic and
distorted reporting which he attributed primarily to foreign reporters in South Vietnam.” Haig
also sensed that local ARVN commanders would withdraw early, even if Thieu directed
otherwise.105
Though frustrating, the negative press reports should not have been surprising to the
White House. In his 12 February diary entry, which described Nixon’s order to restrict media
access to American and South Vietnamese helicopters, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Moorer, explained the president’s fear of American households being exposed to “gory pictures”
if “reporters and news men [are allowed to run] loose in the battle zone.”106 As these efforts,
along with MACV’s press embargo, failed to dampen the media’s backlash, Nixon spent most of
the three weeks from 18 March to 7 April dealing with the aftermath.
While acknowledging that instances of panicking ARVN did occur, Nixon tried to shift
focus to the ARVN units who withdrew orderly. On a 17 March phone call, Admiral Moorer
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assured the president that media reports of ARVN “fleeing” a firebase in Laos were inaccurate,
to which Nixon responded, “This is just a typical newspaper story.”107 Two days later, Nixon and
Kissinger said that the majority of ARVN soldiers conducted themselves honorably, though both
appeared to be more hopeful than factual.
“Nixon: It seems to me they [ARVN] are doing very well.
Kissinger: They are doing it in a very professional way.
Nixon: No panicing [sic] or running.
Kissinger: The other side is suffering very heavy losses too.”108
The argument that panicking soldiers represented only a minority of ARVN troops translated
into part of the messaging strategy for a television interview on 22 March with ABC network’s
Howard K. Smith.
The 22 March Interview
A week before the Smith interview, Nixon received a letter from Private First Class
Clyde Baker, a soldier stationed in South Vietnam who was supporting Lam Son 719. Using the
analogy of a “cowboy backing out of a saloon with guns blazing,” Baker viewed the decision to
embark upon Lam Son 719 as an honorable way to withdraw from the Vietnam War. He
contrasted this with “walking out and getting shot in the back.” This letter from a junior soldier
not only made it to the president’s desk but also apparently made a big enough impression for
Nixon to write, “Excellent ltr! H [Haldeman] – can’t we get one like this out to a columnist?”109
Themes from Baker’s letter, such as the good-guy, gunslinger mentality and the linking of Lam
Son 719 to the greater effort to withdraw from Vietnam, eventually would extend into talking
points for Nixon’s interview.
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In a 20 March telephone call with Kissinger, Nixon said that he would focus “on the
philosophy side” of the argument on Laos and instructed Kissinger not to “talk about victory or
defeat,” but to focus on Lam Son’s contribution to Vietnamization.110 Calling Kissinger on the
morning of the interview, Nixon latched onto a statistic from General Abrams that “4 of 22
[ARVN divisions] were below par,” which he considered a “good average.” Nixon then
reminded Kissinger that he “will be careful not to use victory or success so it won’t look like
whistling in the dark.”111
The most consistent theme of Nixon’s 22 March interview was media bias. In a typical
example, Nixon said, “It is probably true, that I have less, as somebody has said, supporters in
the press than any president.” In addition to periodically returning to this theme, Nixon
accomplished four main objectives in addressing Lam Son 719 during the interview. First, he
avoided assessing the operation as either a victory or defeat by redefining success in terms of the
greater Vietnam War. As Nixon reasoned, “We cannot judge it even after it is concluded.”
Second, Nixon addressed the coverage of fleeing ARVN soldiers by attributing these actions to a
small minority. “While a picture doesn’t lie, a picture may not tell all the truth…. They have
shown only those men in the four ARVN battalions of 22 that were in trouble.” Third, Nixon
took a long-term philosophical justification for the war. Addressing why he could not simply
withdraw U.S. troops, he explained that if “the Communists took over South
Vietnam…peace…would suffer a blow from which it might not recover.” Lastly, Nixon lowered
expectations for the future. While the United States would try to end America’s involvement in
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Vietnam in a way that ensures South Vietnam’s survival, he also cautioned, “We can’t guarantee
their survival.” This was a telling admission and a significant shift from previous statements.112
According to both the administration and media, the President did well. The day after the
interview, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker told Kissinger that he heard that the
interview was “very good—excellent,” and that the South Vietnamese people “are strongly
supporting the action in Laos.” Nixon media consultants Mark Goode and Bill Carruthers wrote
to Haldeman the same day that “the discussion itself went very well,” though they were not
pleased with camera angles and lighting. H.R. Haldeman wrote in his diary the night of the
interview that it “went extremely well on TV; staff reaction was very good.” The president’s
words immediately became the updated talking points for Lam Son 719 throughout the various
public affairs offices of the Departments of State and Defense.113
Military historian William Hammond found that the “news media accepted Nixon’s claim
that the final results of the incursion would become apparent only months in the future, making it
a theme in the weeks that followed. They nevertheless questioned a number of the president’s
other assertions.”114 Some of those questions came from The Washington Post’s Chalmers
Roberts and The New York Times’s Robert Semple and Tom Wicker. The authors’ areas of doubt
included Nixon’s troop withdrawal timeline, his suggestion of unfair media coverage, and his
claims that an objective of Lam Son 719 was to save American lives.115 Each of the weeklies
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also mentioned Nixon’s 22 March interview, though they focused more on the interview’s role in
White House communication, and less on its content about Laos. Time portrayed the interview as
part of a public relations “effort to show the President’s personal side.” Newsweek left open the
possibility that time would prove Lam Son to have been “worthwhile,” but criticized Nixon’s onair claims that he has never contacted media to affect coverage. U.S. News and World Report,
continuing its favorable coverage of the administration, chose to print seven paragraphs from the
official White House transcript of the interview without further editorializing.116 In perhaps the
most telling sign that the interview was a win for Nixon, interviewer Howard K. Smith said in
1997 that he regretted not asking tougher questions and standing firmer against the president
back in 1971.117
The White House believed that the Smith interview successfully reframed the debate over
Lam Son 719 enough to quell the media’s negative reports. During the following week, the
Nixon team began to shift their message. On 24 March, Nixon told Kissinger, in preparation for
Kissinger’s breakfast meeting with conservative journalist Stewart Alsop the next day, “You can
be more off beat than I was. I never used success or victory but now we can say [Lam Son 719]
was a success.” Nixon then explained his parameters for calling the operation a success: “in
terms of their losses against ours and cut supplies and in terms of guarantee of American
withdrawal and reducing threat and strengthening SVN [South Vietnamese] morale and
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Vietnamization.”118 Through this seemingly casual brainstorming over the phone, Nixon outlined
multiple strands of argument in favor of Lam Son, which would form the basis of the White
House’s preparations over the next few weeks. These included: the operation’s support of a U.S.
withdrawal, numbers of enemy killed, captured and wounded, numbers of enemy supplies
captured or destroyed, reducing the North Vietnamese threat, strengthening of South Vietnamese
morale, and Vietnamization.
During the ABC interview, Nixon claimed that one benefit of Lam Son was that “the risk
to American lives is substantially reduced, and that is why the support of that operation was
worthwhile, in my opinion.” It seems likely that the president bet that the American public, while
sympathetic to the South Vietnamese cause, cared more about their own fathers and sons. This
was met with disapproval from the press. In a 23 March New York Times article, journalist Tom
Wicker quoted an American pilot as saying that in at least one instance, to fly his helicopter, he
had to kick clinging ARVN soldiers off of the skids. Wicker used this metaphor of pushing aside
the South Vietnamese “so the American bird can fly” as an “epitaph of the Laotian invasion” and
a criticism of President Nixon’s argument to save American lives.119 Nevertheless, the
administration pushed the point—the operation was saving American lives because it allowed for
U.S. troop withdrawals.
Beginning a few months after taking office in 1969, President Nixon systematically drew
down the number of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam. Before the Nixon administration, the
number of authorized U.S. troops in Vietnam steadily increased for eight consecutive years,
rising most dramatically from under 50,000 at the beginning of 1965 to a peak of nearly 550,000
in April 1969. Through four separate announcements over 1969 and 1970, Nixon progressively
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reduced troop numbers, reaching a promised cap of 284,000 by 1 May 1971.120 Similarly,
combat deaths of U.S. troops in Vietnam, which increased before Nixon took office, declined
from an average of 279 per week on 20 January 1969 to 46 per week by early 1971.121 A primary
part of Nixon’s messaging after Lam Son was that the administration would continue this trend
toward the American military’s ultimate departure from Vietnam.
In a clear nod to the administration’s focus on troop numbers, White House and State
Department staff referred to the president’s 7 April address as a “Troop Withdrawal Statement”
in memos.122 No matter the outcome of Lam Son 719, President Nixon planned to use the
incursion as an opportunity to announce another acceleration of troop withdrawals. That would
be “proof” to the American people of success both in Laos and in Vietnamization. However,
determining this final number would require the balancing of competing demands. On the one
hand, the White House had an American public and a Congress insisting on the complete
removal of U.S. troops as soon as possible. On the other, the South Vietnamese and U.S. military
needed as many troops as possible to remain for as long as possible to ensure the security of
South Vietnam.
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One purpose of Alexander Haig’s March 1971 trip to Vietnam and Cambodia was to
discuss troop numbers in detail on the ground.123 After his discussions with General Abrams on
16 March, Haig questioned whether the White House and MACV plan, which had 60,000 U.S.
troops remaining by 1 September 1972, would be sufficient. Although he felt 60,000 might be
too low, Haig believed that maintaining a troop level between 60,000 and 90,000 in South
Vietnam by 1 September 1972 was an “acceptable risk” given how far ARVN capabilities had
progressed. On Haig’s recommendation, Kissinger passed this range to the president. This
translated to a reduction of approximately 224,000 to 194,000 troops from 1 May 1971 to 1
September 1972. Haig also pointed out that the United States “must be prepared to compensate
with additional financial assistance” for the negative impact American base closures and reduced
personnel would have on the South Vietnamese economy. In Ambassador Bunker’s words, the
United States would be “trading millions for billions.” After his meeting with Haig, Abrams sent
a memo to the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation to make four separate smaller
announcements about withdrawal rates instead of one large announcement to “best preserve
flexibility” and not provide the enemy with the “encouragement” that a large announcement
might. Still, Abrams’ memo suggested removing 224,000 total troops by 1 September 1972. This
represented an average of 14,000 troops per month but Abrams assumed that only one-third of
these troops would be withdrawn in 1971.124
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By late March of 1971, the average withdrawal rate was 12,500 troops per month. If this
“run rate” continued, the U.S. troop level in South Vietnam would fall to 221,500 by 1 October
1971, and 87,500 total troops would depart between 1 May and 1 December 1971. Many in the
press understood remarks from Nixon’s 22 March television interview to mean that he would, at
a minimum, hold the run rate and would announce an end-date for the American presence in
Vietnam during his April address.125 However, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they needed to
announce not only a maintenance of the run rate but an acceleration just to hold American public
opinion at bay. On the opposing side, President Thieu and the U.S. military imposed a ceiling on
the number of personnel that could be sent home. The administration had promised Thieu,
through Ambassador Bunker, that at least 200,000 U.S. troops would remain in South Vietnam
through Thieu’s re-election bid on 7 October 1971. While this number was achievable under the
run rate, a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lower withdrawals to 8,000 per month for the
rest of 1971 was not.126
By 29 March, Nixon and Kissinger decided to increase the withdrawal rate to just over
14,000 troops per month to total 100,000 troops to be removed from South Vietnam between 1
May and 1 December 1971. This would preserve the troop level at just over 200,000 for Thieu’s
re-election, and bring the total troop level down to 184,000 by 1 December. The president and
Kissinger reasoned that the key to producing maximum positive reception from the public was to
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keep the number a secret. In his dispatches back from South Vietnam, Alexander Haig already
was reminding the president and Kissinger to be careful about leaks regarding withdrawal
numbers. “Its premature surfacing,” he warned, “could have a disastrous effect on Thieu’s
election chances and whole stability of [South Vietnam].” Haig thought that leaks could also
deny Nixon a “major campaign coup” back at home.127
The president worried about leaks regarding the withdrawal rate seriously enough to send
a memo to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and CIA
Director Richard Helms. The presidential directive warned their agencies that “there should be
no speculation either on or off the record on the size of the increment or the length of time it
covers.” This appeared to have been directed at Secretary Laird, who Nixon and Kissinger
suspected of leaking to the press that the president would announce an increase to the withdrawal
rate. During a heated phone call with Kissinger on 23 March, Laird also pushed for the president
to announce a deadline for final withdrawal. Further illustrating Laird’s frayed relationship with
the president and National Security Advisor, during a conversation in which Kissinger likened
Laird to “a little boy with his hand in the cookie jar,” Nixon and Kissinger discussed feeding
misinformation to Laird and asking him to pass that false information to the press. Even though
Nixon already decided that he would announce an increase in the total withdrawal number to
100,000 troops, he planned for Kissinger to tell Laird that the president intended to maintain the
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lower run rate number of 87,500, ask Laird to pass this to the press, and inform Laird at the latest
possible opportunity that the president “changed his mind.”128 This strategy of secrecy did not
appear to prevent all leaks. On 2 April, NSC staffer Jon Howe excerpted an ABC TV news
segment that quoted “White House sources” as predicting an acceleration of the withdrawal rate
to 16,000, and even up to 20,000 per month, well above the run rate and even above the rate
Nixon already planned to announce.129
Other administration allies pushed for the president to announce a final deadline,
believing that the focus on the withdrawal rate was futile in efforts to satisfy the public’s demand
to end the war. NSC staffer W.R. Smyser, a former State Department diplomat, wrote to
Kissinger that after a survey of members of Congress and Washington insiders, he believed that
even a “substantial increase” in the withdrawal rate would neither help the president buy time
nor would it increase domestic support. If Nixon was not yet prepared to announce a time limit,
Smyser recommended that he explain why setting a deadline would harm U.S. interests. Echoing
Smyser’s push for a total troop withdrawal, Senator John Sherman Cooper, co-author of the
Cooper-Church Amendment, told Kissinger that the president “will have to say that they [U.S.
troops] are going to come out. It keeps tension in the country up. That’s one of the problems.”
Former congressman and White House congressional advisor Clark MacGregor reported that
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even “hawkish” congressmen were pushing for a promise of no new deployments to Vietnam in
conjunction with an acceleration in withdrawals. MacGregor hoped that Nixon’s 7 April
statement would be “different in degree and kind,” not simply stating a troop number and date as
the president had done in previous statements.130
Within this debate about troop withdrawals, administration officials also mulled
eliminating the draft, a 1968 campaign promise and still a goal for Nixon. The Gates
Commission, the president’s 15-member panel tasked with studying its possibility, concluded in
1970 that an all-volunteer army was feasible. After meeting with General Abrams in Saigon,
Alexander Haig recommended to Kissinger that the army should study whether an all-volunteer
force could sustain 50,000 to 60,000 troops by 1 September 1971. Haig reported, “Chances
appear good from here but General Abrams has declined to commit himself on this item.”131 To
the consternation of many, including conservative journalist William Buckley, Nixon would
make no mention of ending the draft on 7 April. That night, after first assuring Henry Kissinger
of his positive review of the television address, Buckley asked why the president did not end the
draft. Kissinger responded, “The numbers are still too high. That is our plan. This is the first
thing we will do when we are at the number that permits it.” Kissinger later continued, “On the
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draft business, you can be assured we will get to it. I have seen the Army and am convinced that
a major change is needed.”132 However, the draft would remain until 27 January 1973.
During this period between the president’s 22 March interview and 7 April speech, along
with debating the troop withdrawal number, Nixon’s team also researched Lam Son battle
statistics and propaganda. The administration used enemy casualties and destroyed supplies as
another data point to quantify Lam Son’s contribution to the overall war. The collection of these
statistics first began, as is usual after any military operation, with intelligence estimates. As early
as late February, Kissinger sent the president examples of disruptions to enemy supplies that
were gathered from intercepted North Vietnamese messages. Kissinger continued to press for
assessments of such statistics through his chairmanship of the Washington Special Actions
Group (WSAG), a committee formed in 1969 to deal with crises. By 1971, the WSAG consisted
of officials from the National Security Council, State and Defense Departments, the CIA, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the White House. From late-March through the first week of April,
conversations about these counts centered on complementary reports from the CIA and Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), in which the CIA focused more on supplies destroyed and captured
while the DIA focused on human casualties.133
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These intelligence numbers then became tools for political messaging. Nixon instructed
Kissinger on 20 March to “get it down to short terms so people can understand it…terms like
traffic to south cut more than half. Also the idea of guns and rounds of ammo. Millions of
pounds of rice is good. Get it in words and see if you or Ken [speechwriter Khachigian] can get it
into colorful language.”134 Although the president avoided getting into details of enemy
casualties and supplies during his 22 March ABC interview, these numbers remained the
administration’s main talking points about Lam Son once they decided to justify the operation as
a victory. Up to a week before his 7 April address, Nixon considered including these numbers in
the speech before ultimately deciding otherwise.
The administration also grappled with the issue of countering North Vietnamese
propaganda during this period. Writing to Bunker and Abrams on 27 March, Secretary of State
Rogers blamed the “world press” and a “well orchestrated communist claque” for repeating
Hanoi’s claims of victory in Lam Son 719. As a result, the White House expected “a significant
psychological problem” and wanted to ensure that Thieu would take steps to counter this
communist propaganda.135 After meeting with Thieu on 2 April to pass this message from the
administration, Bunker reported back that “much was already underway.” Thieu’s efforts
included television and radio propaganda, public rallies in provincial capitals, parades, press
conferences, troop visits, and monetary and other rewards for troops and their families. President
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Nixon also gave suggestions. In a discussion with Kissinger about a failed operation in which 24
American servicemen were killed in comparison to 12 North Vietnamese, Nixon suggested
publicly distributing information about political divisions within North Vietnam, which the
White House received through communications intelligence, and an overall assessment of
Hanoi’s heavy losses.136
The administration counteracted prominent Americans on the propaganda front as well.
Throughout March, Kissinger wrestled over his response to a request from Harold Willens, a
wealthy California peace activist who founded a group called Business Executives Move for
Vietnam Peace. Willens was planning a personal trip to South Vietnam and asked for the
American embassy’s assistance with introductions. Because of their wealth and political
connections, members of groups like Willens’s represented a portion of the domestic anti-war
movement that the White House could not dismiss easily. Willens once described how the
administration often characterized anti-war protestors “as either soft on Communism or softheaded, period,” a charge that was difficult to lodge onto successful, well-established
executives.137 Kissinger described him as “obviously not a friend of the administration nor a
friend of the Vietnamese Government.” After first refusing to offer assistance, Kissinger later
decided that a better strategy was to shape “what kind of picture” Willens would receive from his
trip by asking Ambassador Bunker to assign embassy personnel to help with his eventual April
1971 visit.138
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Amid these discussions over troop withdrawal numbers, Lam Son numbers, and
countering propaganda, Nixon’s speechwriting team, spearheaded by future conservative
stalwart and three-time presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan, along with input from all corners of
the administration, began crafting the address for 7 April. Progressive drafts of this speech, in
conjunction with memoranda and telephone transcripts from various administration officials
during this time, show that while certain details were added and dropped during the normal
editing process, main themes remained. Consistent items of focus included big-picture language
about the American character, efforts to differentiate this speech from past addresses, and
arguments for the reduction of American involvement in Vietnam. The team also avoided certain
topics, some from the beginning and some over the process of writing. These topics included
details to justify Lam Son 719, negotiations with the North Vietnamese, and the My Lai
massacre.
In the week following the president’s ABC interview, the administration and its
surrogates spoke out aggressively about Laos to offset negative media assessments. They
hammered the same talking points: that more supplies were destroyed than in the Cambodian
operation, that Hanoi was set back many months and kept from undertaking any major
offensives, and that the U.S. and South Vietnamese had achieved their goals.139 Believing that
this strategy of repeating talking points was making little headway in changing public opinion,
some in Nixon’s team advocated for focusing on the “big picture” in the 7 April speech.
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On 27 March, Winston Lord, Kissinger’s special assistant and future ambassador to
China, wrote to the national security advisor, “I don’t think a discussion of Laos should dominate
the speech; the major focus should be on the big picture of how far we have come and where we
are going.” Two days later, Pat Buchanan sent the president a memo in which communications
staff assistant Ken Khachigian proposed making the bulk of the speech “a thoughtful, brief
lecture on the American character.” Khachigian continued, “This is the time for the President to
wear the hat of moral authority, of America’s calm voice in the face of heated overstatement.”
On the cover letter, Buchanan argued that the “nation has heard, again and again and again, the
arguments of what we are doing, and have done and why…the president can communicate to the
people far more on his mind than simply the outcome of Laos – and the future of troop
withdrawals.” Buchanan later reiterated his worry of “unnecessarily repeat[ed] word
formulations and arguments the country has heard too many times.” Henry Kissinger disagreed.
Kissinger felt that the “basic arguments” that the administration had been constantly repeating
about Vietnam, including the statistics justifying Lam Son 719, were still important. The battle
lines were drawn, with Lord, Buchanan, and Khachigian, making up the “big picture” camp and
pressing for a move away from the details.140 The final speech ultimately represented the “big
picture” camp. Nixon justified Lam Son 719 through general terms and referred only to
“achievements,” rather than “success,” in Laos. In another indicator of the administration’s focus
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on the domestic audience, Nixon ensured that American troop counts were the only numbers
mentioned in the entire address.
Nixon’s congressional expert, Clark MacGregor, suggested to Kissinger that the speech
be “different in kind and degree” from previous statements because “America needs a lift!”
Though speaking about Congress, MacGregor’s description of a “deepening mood of
depression” could have described the rest of American society.141 Ambassador to the United
Nations John Scalli also argued that the speech needed more than withdrawal numbers, warning
that “critics will step up the attack” otherwise. Using the president’s 7 October 1970 speech, his
last television address on Vietnam, and their background materials as a point of comparison,
Nixon’s writing team generated new themes to differentiate this speech from past ones.142
One important theme remained the reduction of American involvement in Vietnam as
proof of the success of Lam Son and Vietnamization. Near the top of a document titled “Main
Points in President’s Speech,” Nixon aides wrote, “It is a complete distortion to call Lam Son a
defeat; the best proof of its overall success is the fact that the withdrawal rate has actually been
increased.”143 Nixon stated on 22 March that Lam Son was worthwhile because it saved
American lives, with one calculable manifestation being troop withdrawals. Akin to arguing
whether a chicken or egg comes first, Nixon’s speechwriters now argued that it was the
acceleration of withdrawals which proved Lam Son’s success. This shift from “success is
justified by the numbers” to “increased withdrawals means success” happened between 30
March and 1 April. A 30 March speech draft devoted five pages to Laos, put it near the top of the
speech, and listed damaged enemy supplies in painstaking detail. On 1 April, speechwriter
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William Safire sent a new draft in which he “makes less of the laborious defense of the Laos
operation” and urged that “the story of how many troops coming out by when be put up in the
lead. Holding it for the end is a cheap device and we have never done it yet.”144 In the final
speech, Nixon stated at the outset, “I have decided to increase the rate of American troop
withdrawals for the period from May 1 to December 1.” As he did with a map in his television
address about Cambodia almost one year prior, Nixon would use a visual aid, this time a graph,
to bring home the point to viewers.145
The writing team initially prepared two graphs, one showing the “Authorized Troop
Level in South Vietnam” and another showing “U.S. Combat Deaths in Southeast Asia,”
although Nixon used only the troop level chart. The team placed the graph on an easel to the
president’s right and the camera occasionally panned and zoomed to it throughout the speech.
The graph charted U.S. troop numbers in Vietnam from the early 1960s, through the day of the
address, and continued until 1 December 1971. The display showed the troop number increase
from under 50,000 in early 1965 to reach its peak of 549,500 around Nixon’s inauguration. This
line then traced the troop number’s steady decline to 284,000 by 7 April 1971, and its predicted
further decline by the promised 100,000 troops to reach 184,000 by 1 December 1971. This
visual aid dramatically illustrated the decline in troop levels since Nixon took office.146
As a reminder of the perils of this American-centric view of measuring the war’s success
by the number of American lives saved, Secretary Laird cautioned the president on 6 April that
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while American involvement decreases, danger to the ARVN would increase as they take over
more of the combat. Laird implored, “I believe it is important to keep these factors in mind as the
enemy is in the Spring campaign cycle, normally his most active period of the year.”147 As late
as two days before the speech, Kissinger recommended that President Nixon add lines that
detailed the decrease to South Vietnamese casualties as well as the reduction of U.S. bombing.
Senator George McGovern, Nixon’s eventual opponent in the 1972 election, was among those
arguing that Vietnamization was simply “substituting Asian for American casualties,” a group
that Kissinger referred to as “Doves.”148 This resulted in Nixon’s addition of a sentence: “South
Vietnamese casualties have also dropped significantly in the past two years.” However, its
meaning was diminished by being sandwiched between detail about the fivefold drop in
American casualties over two years and a return to the focus on saving American lives: “One
American dying in combat is one too many. But our goal is no American fighting man dying
anyplace in the world. Every decision I have made in the past and every decision I make in the
future will have the purpose of achieving that goal.”149
Another topic that the speechwriting team had intended to tackle in the 7 April address
was peace negotiations. Six months earlier, the president spoke publicly about negotiations with
Hanoi for the first time during a 7 October 1970 television address. Up until this 1970 address,
Nixon had hoped that secrecy would lead to progress in either the public talks led by Henry
Cabot Lodge or private ones led by Henry Kissinger. However, by late 1970, negotiations had
stalled. To break the impasse, Nixon used the 1970 address to outline the American position
publicly: a cease-fire, an international peace conference, negotiation of a timetable for complete
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withdrawal, a political settlement for South Vietnam, and an immediate release of prisoners-ofwar. As Henry Kissinger wrote of the administration’s goals at the time, “All senior officials
came to favor anything that might get the negotiations off dead center and our critics off the front
pages.” Kissinger recalled that while this was initially well-received, with even the
administration’s detractors in Congress and the press praising the speech as reasonable, Hanoi
rejected it shortly afterward, freezing negotiations again.150 Even with this checkered track
record, in 1971, Nixon’s writing team again considered keeping the topic of negotiations at the
forefront of the address. The public clamoring for an announced end to the war was just too loud
to ignore. However, Nixon would change course at the last minute.
A 28 March speech draft devoted an entire paragraph to the “hope for a negotiated
settlement” within the first minute of the speech. Nixon removed this paragraph but kept another
paragraph on negotiations later in the speech. The night before the address, Nixon also removed
this commentary after consultation with Kissinger. At the same time, he removed another
paragraph offering to negotiate with Hanoi on a fixed timetable for mutual withdrawal and reworded a passage about prisoners-of-war.151 In the final televised version, Nixon would devote
just two paragraphs to the topics of negotiations and withdrawal timetables, located near the
middle of the speech. In his paragraph addressing negotiations, he cited the same five points
from October 1970. In the paragraph addressing his decision not to publish a timetable, Nixon
explained that doing so would only make it more difficult to free prisoners-of-war, remove the
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incentive for a settlement, and give the enemy information to launch attacks against the
American military.
Eleventh-hour edits to speech drafts show the sensitivity and importance that the
administration placed on messaging and also the difficulty of these choices. Another of Nixon’s
last-minute removals was any reference to the My Lai massacre. Amid Nixon’s speech
preparation, the trial of William Calley, the only officer convicted for the killing of unarmed
civilians at the South Vietnamese village of My Lai, commanded front-page coverage. Calley
was convicted on 29 March, sentenced on 31 March, and received a downgrade of his sentence
from the president on 1 April. A 30 March draft of the 7 April address devoted two paragraphs to
the Calley trial, and three subsequent paragraphs to supporting the troops. One paragraph directly
addressing Calley remained in a 4 April draft, but was removed two days later, with its meaning
imbedded into two phrases: “atrocity charges in individual cases” and “isolated acts of cruelty.”
This 6 April draft also argued that these isolated acts were the exception to “the tens of
thousands of individual American soldiers who…have tried to help the people of South
Vietnam.” This phrasing remained in the final draft. Pat Buchanan wrote that the “point about
troops is made – and no one will be ignorant of what we are referring to.”152 The president
ultimately decided against mentioning any negative aspects of the Vietnam War. Even during his
final preparations mere hours before delivering the address, Nixon continued editing to keep
things upbeat, telling Kissinger that “people don’t want to hear about sorrow so much.”153
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The 7 April TV Address
The result of all of this research, strategizing, and writing between 22 March and 7 April
was a well-received address that stopped short of calling Lam Son a success and refrained from
setting a final deadline for American departure from Vietnam. Nixon’s punchline, previewed at
the top of the speech and specified in detail six minutes later, was that “between May 1 and
December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South
Vietnam.” This was after Nixon reminded viewers, using his visual aid, that U.S. troop numbers
had consistently declined since he took office. He then declared Cambodia a “success,” touted
great “achievements” in Laos, and linked this accelerated troop withdrawal as proof of the
success of Vietnamization.
By choosing not to include any numbers in the speech outside of U.S. troop counts,
Nixon’s writers deliberately refocused the goal of the war to be about saving American lives.
This built upon the groundwork the president began on 22 March and is further illustrated
through some seemingly throwaway comments. After announcing the 100,000-troop withdrawal
Nixon stated, “The Government of South Vietnam fully supports the decision I have just
announced.” Rather than elaborate on how the United States would ensure the viability of South
Vietnam without American troops, Nixon immediately pivoted, saying, “Now, let’s look toward
the future.” In other references to South Vietnam’s future, Nixon used phrases such as “leave in a
way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive,” and “leave Vietnam in a
way that offers a brave people a realistic hope of freedom,” a significant downgrade from the
original goal of “preserving a non-Communist South Vietnam.” The president placed U.S.
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withdrawal as his primary goal, a stable South Vietnam as his second, and crafted the narrative to
accommodate these priorities.154
It would turn out to be another last-minute addition that garnered the president his most
positive headlines the next day. Nixon decided to conclude his speech with an emotional
anecdote, which he wrote in secret on a yellow legal pad and kept out of the advance transcript
for the media.155 Rick Perlstein calls it a “sentimental climax, a masterpiece,” which he narrates
vividly in Nixonland:
“‘We had an award ceremony in the East Room of the White House just a few weeks ago.
And at that ceremony I remember one of the recipients, Mrs. Karl Taylor, from
Pennsylvania. Her husband was a Marine sergeant, Sergeant Karl Taylor…After I
presented her the Medal, I shook hands with their two children, Karl, Jr.–he was 8 years
old-and Kevin, who was 4. As I was about to move to the next recipient, Kevin suddenly
stood at attention and saluted.’
Pause.
‘I found it rather difficult to get my thoughts together.’
[Nixon’s] voice deepened.
‘My fellow Americans, I want to end this war in a way that is worthy of the sacrifice of
Karl Taylor.’
[Nixon] was speaking very slowly.
‘And I think he would want me to end it in a way that would increase the chances that
Kevin and Karl, and all those children like them here and around the world, could grow
up in a world where none of them would have to die in war; that would increase the
chance for America to have what it has not had in this century–a full generation of
peace.’”156
President Nixon added the Taylor Family anecdote less than one day before the speech. H.R.
Haldeman was still tracking down details for Mrs. Taylor, Karl, Jr., and Kevin on 6 April as he
wrote in his notes that day, “from mil aide – the 5 yr old that saluted was he the brother? –
details.”157 Because the addition was so rushed, no one from the White House staff had time to
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contact Mrs. Taylor beforehand. Nixon said to Kissinger after the speech, “I hope the mother
stands up and – I haven’t checked that with her but she will do the right thing, she was a
Marine’s wife.”158 Kissinger then called Mrs. Taylor an hour later, at 11:28pm, to convey that
the president “asked me to call you and apologize for using your name but he felt he wanted to
do this to make his point and he hoped that you weren’t hurt.” Mrs. Taylor responded, “I was
rather shocked but very proud.”159
The next day, The New York Times published an article with the headline, “Salute
Returned to a Boy by Nixon.” The article quoted Mrs. Taylor, declaring that her late husband
“believed in what he was doing and he thought he had to do it for the sake of his children.” Other
articles featuring the family, such as that by the Associated Press, included a photo of four-yearold Kevin Taylor saluting in his pajamas from his living room. H.R. Haldeman remarked to the
president after presenting him the Times article, “If we’d staged it we couldn’t have thought it up
better.” Haldeman also wrote in his diary on the day after the address that Nixon “was very
pleased with the way he worked the emotional part into the speech, and thinks that’s what really
made it, and of course, he’s absolutely right.”160
After delivering the speech, Nixon initially said that he did not want to take any calls that
evening. However, he could not help but revert to his habit of post-game analysis and spoke on
the phone at least nine times before the night’s end. Members of the president’s inner circle
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quickly praised the address. Henry Kissinger told Nixon that it was “the best speech you
delivered since you have been in office,” reported that television news commentators John
Chancellor and Dan Rather gave favorable reviews, and conveyed how “moved – overwhelmed”
staffers Alexander Haig and Winston Lord were. Ambassador Bunker cabled from Saigon that
the speech “has inspired us all with a renewed sense of dedication and determination.” Reverend
Billy Graham believed that the president diffused his critics and told him that his “sincerity and
manner of presentation was just excellent.”161
It appeared that the speech also received a positive reception from the American people.
The Opinion Research Corporation, a market research company founded in 1938 by Claude
Robinson and George Gallup, announced that the percentage of those polled who said they
approved “of the way President Nixon is handling the Vietnam situation” increased from 41% in
early March 1971 to 48% by mid-April 1971.162 David Derge, the president of another market
research firm hired by the administration, Behavioral Research Associates, reported that of those
who had seen, heard, or read about President Nixon’s public appearances since 1 March 1971,
“the favorable reactions to these appearances outnumber the unfavorable reactions two to one.”
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However, Derge pointed out that he did not know whether the favorable group “was already
largely in agreement with the president on most matters.”163
Print media, however, was not yet sold by Nixon’s latest arguments. Most journalists for
the main American weekly magazines felt that President Nixon had not said anything new.
Time’s authors wrote that when “Richard Nixon appeared on television to discuss his embattled
Viet Nam policy, he changed virtually nothing.” They also called the 7 April address a “foxhole
speech, digging tenaciously in defense of his existing position.” Newsweek’s writers also
lamented that this was “more of the same” from the administration and criticized Nixon’s refusal
“to set a date for completion.” Consistent with their more supportive stance towards the
administration, coverage in U.S. News and World Report remained neutral, basically reiterating
the president’s statements from 7 April.164
Correspondents from daily newspapers echoed similar criticisms the following day. Both
The New York Times and The Washington Post printed the full text of the speech. Max Frankel of
The Times called Nixon’s address a “vigorous defense of his objectives and tactics” and objected
to Nixon’s plea to “listeners to take his word over those of television and newspaper reporters
and analysts.” Frankel also deduced from Nixon’s change in tone that the president “had
powerful personal as well as official reasons for wishing to end the war.” Times editors wrote
that Nixon “did not change his policy, just the way he defended it.” Even in James Naughton’s
article profiling the Taylor family, with which the president and H.R. Haldeman were so pleased,
the piece did not pass judgment on either the administration’s policy nor the success of Nixon’s
communication strategy. Naughton simply quoted Mrs. Taylor’s positive words without
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including his assessment.165 Chalmers Roberts of The Washington Post pointed out Nixon’s
refusal to set a deadline. Roberts also quoted four senators and a member of Congress, including
Democratic Senator and Nixon’s eventual 1972 opponent George McGovern, the Cooper-Church
Amendment’s more moderate Democratic Senator Frank Church, and Republican Representative
and future vice president Gerald Ford, all of whom reacted “along predictable lines.” In another
Post article that day, Don Oberdorfer criticized Nixon for three failures: to set an end date, to end
the draft, and to change the U.S. role in Vietnam from ground combat to air support. He
questioned how Nixon would fulfill his promise to end the war as well.166 Finally, The Wall
Street Journal’s editors wrote that the increase in the withdrawal rate to 14,300 per month was
“certain to leave critics dissatisfied.” Robert Keatley described the speech as “generally hardline” and wrote that the president “drew praise from his supporters but failed to move his
critics.” Keatley also interpreted Nixon’s language about being “held accountable by the
American people” to mean that he would either withdraw all Americans from Vietnam before the
1972 election or is prepared to “face the consequences at the polls.”167
In a foreshadowing of the new direction to which American foreign policy would shift,
all three dailies also featured front-page coverage about China inviting the United States ping
pong team to visit Beijing alongside their coverage of the president’s speech. As Takashi Oka
wrote in The New York Times, “Some analysts of Chinese affairs here view the invitation as
Peking’s [Beijing’s] first concrete response to a series of American moves aimed at improving
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relations with China.” The Post’s Terence Smith quoted a State Department official as saying
that the invitation is “clearly consistent with the hopes expressed by the President and Secretary
of State that there could be greater contact between the American and Chinese peoples.”168
While it appears that Nixon first heard of the Chinese table tennis invitation along with
the public, he would have seen the move as a result of his work over the last year towards a
normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. The United States and China had
maintained an ambassadorial-level bilateral line of communication since 1 August 1955. These
talks aimed to “discuss the repatriation of nationals and other issues of mutual concern.” With
the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the start of the Korean War in 1950, and the U.S.
refusal to recognize the new Chinese government, U.S. citizens in China and Chinese citizens in
the U.S. faced difficulties returning home. First started in Geneva in 1955, and later moved to
Warsaw in 1958, the last of these intermittent talks, later dubbed the “Warsaw Meetings,”
occurred on 20 February 1970. The Chinese canceled the next meeting scheduled for 20 May due
to their objection to the U.S. and South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia, effectively ending
these formal talks.169 Skeptical of the State Department’s ability to contain leaks, Nixon and
Kissinger established secret contacts to China through multiple channels on their own, including
in Paris and Romania. However, the most fruitful ended up being Pakistani President Yahya
Khan.
This direct but slow channel, relying on hand-carried, unsigned sheets of paper between
the U.S. president and national security advisor to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou En Lai,
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became active in late 1970. By the time China extended its invitation to the American ping-pong
team on 6 April 1971, at least three messages had been transmitted through the Pakistani channel
between the U.S. and Chinese leaders. In October 1970, Nixon and Kissinger asked the Chinese
to normalize relations. A month later, Mao and Zhou responded that they would accept a special
envoy to Beijing to discuss the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. In December, the
Americans countered that the meeting in Beijing “would not be limited only to the Taiwan
question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions.”
As a nod to Taiwan, Nixon added that “the policy of the United States Government is to reduce
its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region
diminish.” Both sides also took steps to signal an easing of tensions from late 1970 to early 1971,
such as Mao hosting exiled American journalist Edgar Snow in Beijing and Nixon ending the
restriction on Americans traveling to China.170
China’s move was not unexpected. While awaiting a response to their December
message, Nixon and Kissinger tracked positive signs from the Chinese side. Days after Nixon
lifted the travel restrictions, Kissinger reported that “the Chinese really blasted Russia,” when
Chinese newspapers criticized the USSR for being overly militaristic and expansionist on the
hundredth anniversary of the Paris Commune, the two-month-long takeover of Paris by a
socialist government in 1871, which was revered by communist leaders.171 Days after the ping
pong invitation was announced, Nixon admitted to Kissinger, Haldeman, and former journalist
and administration media consultant John Scali that he “did not know the Ping-Pong team was
going to happen like that.” However, Kissinger expressed his “feeling that something was going
170

MacMillan, 173-176. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, eds.
Steven E. Phillips and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006) (hereafter, FRUS,
Volume XVII), Document 99.
171
Tape of a 19 March 1971 11:45am Oval Office meeting between President Nixon and Kissinger in Brinkley and
Nichter, 51.

64

to happen,” and for months, Nixon had expected “some thaw.”172 Besides, Kissinger did not
doubt that the Chinese, who he considered “very subtle,” chose the invitation’s timing with great
consideration. Nixon, just before a farewell call with the outgoing Taiwanese Ambassador and
soon-to-be Foreign Minister Zhou Shu Kai, wondered aloud to Kissinger whether it was
deliberate on the part of the Chinese that the ping pong team made front-page news on the same
day of this meeting. “No question,” replied the national security advisor.173
The timing was fortuitous for both sides. Although the release of the Pentagon Papers in
June 1971 would renew the debate about the origins of America’s involvement in Vietnam, the
public’s attention on the current war would wane with Nixon’s 7 April TV address. For the
remainder of 1971, much of the public’s focus was redirected towards the warming of relations
with China, beginning with Nixon’s July 1971 announcement of his trip to Beijing and
culminating with Nixon’s historic visit, the first by a U.S. president, in February 1972. Nixon’s 7
April television address and the ping pong invitation would set in motion a string of
developments that allowed Nixon, by 1972, to achieve his goal of putting Vietnam in the
rearview so that he could concentrate on other global ambitions.
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Chapter 4: Why Did Nixon’s Plan Work?
In the period leading up to the president’s 7 April speech, Nixon needed to combat any
argument that America was abandoning South Vietnam. Senator George McGovern, Nixon’s
future 1972 opponent, and an outspoken congressional “dove,” characterized the United States
withdrawal as simply “substituting Asian for American casualties.” Two days before the speech,
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed ways to address this charge. Expressing his
frustration with liberal politicians who opposed his policies, Nixon asserted, “I’ve determined to
just see it [withdrawal] through and the hell with them…. If it fails, it fails.” After Kissinger
reassured the president by calling this a “heroic posture,” Nixon explained further, “Believe it or
not, there is no other course for this country.” Richard Nixon planned to accelerate the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam no matter the result of Lam Son 719 and crafted his
narrative to the American people to suit this end.174
The danger of South Vietnam falling to the communists was always a possibility.
However, the prevention of this risk became less of a priority to the administration as they
increasingly focused on saving American lives. President Nixon showed this by downplaying the
language he used to describe his goals for South Vietnam. Phrases such as “we cannot guarantee
their survival” from 22 March and “reasonable chance to survive” and “realistic hope of
freedom” from 7 April reflected the demotion of South Vietnam in the president’s priorities. This
was not lost on the South Vietnamese either. The author of a Newsweek article from 5 April
quoted a Saigon resident as remarking, “Vietnamization…means only that the color of the bodies
is now different.”175 As early as 11 March, a week before news of an ARVN retreat from Laos
began to hit the U.S. press, Nixon said privately, “I don’t give a goddamn if they leave
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tomorrow.” Moreover, though they maintained a façade of indecision for public relations, Nixon
and Kissinger set the withdrawal number at 100,000 American troops at least a week prior to the
7 April announcement. The only factor restraining Nixon from authorizing a higher number was
the threat of Thieu losing his October 1971 election, a loss of face that would be too great for the
United States to bear.176 If military victory over Hanoi and saving South Vietnam became
increasingly unrealistic goals, then why did Nixon undertake Lam Son 719?
Into the operation’s initial phase, Nixon, Kissinger, and other decision-makers
maintained optimism that Lam Son 719 could prove to be the strategic blow to the Ho Chi Minh
Trail that forced Hanoi to a negotiated peace. On 22 February, when Phase Two of the operation
was already diverging from the plan and some ARVN soldiers had retreated from firebases
inside Laos, Admiral Moorer still told the president, “we had trouble with the one battalion,” but
“we just have to stay with this thing. I think it is going to come out all right.”177 Even if the onset
was rooted in idealism, reality set in by mid-March after the operation’s major setbacks. By that
time, with clear victory no longer a possibility, the operation’s purpose shifted. On 16 March,
after declaring to Kissinger that Laos was “the right thing to do,” the president explained that the
purpose of both the Cambodian and Laotian incursions was “getting to another point. Now we’ve
reached the other point…. Now, every decision is now made not in terms of, well, what’s the
effect going to be on Saigon. The decision has got to be made on what’s the effect on us.”178
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As Nixon went on to discuss the status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
with the Soviet Union, one can infer that the “other point” to which the president referred meant
America’s other global ambitions such as SALT and China. Nixon also gave insight into Lam
Son’s purpose five days earlier. “We’ve tried everything. We’ve done everything the military
wanted. We have—we’ve done everything to our own satisfaction in order to bring the war to a
successful conclusion.” The president was blunter when addressing ARVN capabilities without
U.S. ground support. “It’s good for them to learn how strong they are and how weak. But I’m not
going to allow their weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to-to-to delay us.”179 Even
if the president believed that one purpose of Lam Son 719 was to show that the United States
exhausted all options in Vietnam before withdrawing, how would he explain this to the
American people, especially to those that lost loved ones in this war?
As word trickled in about ARVN retreating hastily from Laos, Kissinger assured the
president, “About PR, we don’t have to worry much. In fact, we can make it very positive.”180
The writing team that worked on Nixon’s public remarks on 22 March and 7 April, as well as the
administration’s allies who hit the airwaves in support of the president’s policies, embraced this
mentality of accentuating the positive. Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim wrote to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 23 March that whether or not Lam Son 719 was a tactical military
success, the minds of most Americans would be on U.S. withdrawals and “our determination to
shift our strategic attention to other more important world goals.”181 This was essential as things
looked quite dismal for the administration in late March to early April.
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In the weeks leading up to the 7 April 1971 speech, all of the news coverage of Vietnam
focused on either the failure of Lam Son 719 or the Calley trial. In addition to negativity in the
media embodied by headlines such as Newsweek’s “A Bleak Week for Richard Nixon,” the
administration also faced an unhappy public.182 A Gallup poll taken on 5 April showed that
“public confidence in the way President Nixon is handling his job,” fell below 50% for the first
time in his administration.183 Joseph Alsop wrote in the 8 April issue of The Washington Post
that several White House staff members “came close to panic in the post-Laos political
atmosphere.”184 It would have been hard to imagine from this low point that only eight months
later, the president would begin his most consequential year in office.
For Richard Nixon, 1972 was a banner year. It began with historic trips to Beijing and
Moscow in February and May and concluded with an unprecedented November landslide
election victory. The contrast to 1971 could not have been starker. While initial newspaper
coverage of Nixon’s Beijing visit criticized the president for acceding to Chinese demands,
especially concerning Taiwan, this did not dull the American public’s awe in seeing images of
the president walking the Great Wall. Henry Kissinger later wrote, “For once a White House
public relations strategy succeeded, and performed a diplomatic function as well. Pictures
overrode the printed word.” Perhaps even more helpful to the administration was how news from
China began to overshadow Vietnam. “As the American public gained hope from the China
visit,’ Kissinger maintained, “Vietnam became less an obsession and more a challenge to be
mastered. The Administration that had revolutionized international relations could not so easily
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be accused of neglecting the deepest concern of the American people.”185 With Watergate’s
shadow looming over much of President Nixon’s second term, it is often overlooked that
Nixon’s 1972 election over McGovern was a historic victory. Nixon won 49 of the 50 states,
representing 96.7 percent of electoral votes, and nearly 61 percent of the popular vote, the largest
popular vote margin since 1936.186 Due to factors both within and outside of his control, the
president was able to overcome the public negativity toward Lam Son, the Vietnam War, and the
credibility gap in early 1971 to create opportunities for the successes he achieved in 1972.
Among the actions within Nixon’s control was his public messaging in 1971 in the wake
of Lam Son 719. In contrast to the Cambodian incursion of 1970—which resulted in massive,
violent demonstrations all across the country—public backlash to Lam Son 719 was muted. This
was due, in part, to the administration’s change in communication strategy from 1970 to 1971.
The president’s public messaging for Lam Son differed from that for Cambodia in both
frequency and content. Riding the positive momentum from his “silent majority” speech in late
1969, on 20 April 1970, Nixon announced an additional withdrawal of 150,000 American troops
from South Vietnam. However, ten days later, he went on the air again to announce the invasion
of Cambodia.
This second announcement sparked uprisings around the United States, such as at Kent
State and other institutions by Americans opposed to a perceived escalation in the Vietnam War.
On 3 June 1970, Nixon gave a television address in which he declared Cambodia the “most
successful operation of this long and very difficult war.” In contrast, the president made no
announcements before the start of Lam Son 719. Instead he left messaging to the South
Vietnamese and Department of Defense briefers. Nixon’s first words about the Laotian operation
185

Kissinger, White House Years, 1092, 1094.
“President Nixon’s 14 Addresses to the Nation on Vietnam,” Richard Nixon Foundation, accessed on 20 October,
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/president-richard-nixons-14-addresses-nation-vietnam/.

186

70

were in the form of a television interview on 22 March 1971. And although Nixon’s postoperation television address on 7 April 1971 had echoes of his post-Cambodia address from 3
June 1970, the two speeches widely varied in content.187
In his 3 June 1970 speech, the president first called the Cambodian operation a success.
He then reiterated the reasons for escalating the war. This was followed by a painstakingly
detailed list of captured arms and supplies: “10 million rounds of ammunition,” “over 15,000
rifles and machine guns and other weapons,” over 2,000 “heavy mortars and rocket launchers
and recoilless rifles,” “90,000 rounds of ammunition,” and “more than 11 millions pounds of
rice.” To illustrate the point, Nixon also showed a few minutes of a grainy Department of
Defense video of American soldiers walking among captured enemy weapons and rice while the
president provided the voice-over. Nixon then explained that the Cambodian operation “insured
the continuance and success of our troop withdrawal program,” and that this operation would
help to withdraw 50,000 of the 150,000 soldiers as promised two months earlier. It was this very
level of detail and plethora of numbers against which Winston Lord, Pat Buchanan, and other
“big picture” camp advisors argued in 1971, ultimately resulting in a far different address on 7
April.188
The change in the form and content of messaging from 1970 to 1971 was a strategic
decision by the administration. However, fortuitous factors outside of Nixon’s control also
contributed to his ability to shift attention away from Lam Son 719 and the Vietnam War. One
factor was the Cooper-Church Amendment. While the administration viewed the amendment,
which forbade the use of ground troops outside of South Vietnam, as a hindrance to their military
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capabilities in Laos, this restriction had the unintended consequence of reducing public backlash
to the operation by limiting the number of American casualties. The average number of
American combat deaths in Vietnam and related operations, which totaled over 100 per week in
June 1970, dropped to 46 per week by April 1971. Nixon’s team even created a chart titled “U.S.
Combat Deaths in Southeast Asia” copying the format of the troop withdrawal chart he used on
television. This second chart showed a steady decline in combat deaths since Nixon took office.
The president ultimately decided against using it for the address.189 The increased danger faced
by ARVN troops, now lacking the support of American ground troops in Laos, was one impetus
for George McGovern’s claim that the administration was merely substituting Asian bodies for
American ones.190
Another factor from which the administration benefited was the decline of the anti-war
movement. The implementation of a draft lottery system on 1 December 1969, which gave
potential draftees much more clarity on their risk of being called up, “eased the psychological
strain” for many young American men before Nixon ended the draft completely in December
1972. As foreign policy expert Adam Garfinkle argues in Telltale Hearts, the anti-war campaign
was not as crucial a factor in bringing about the end of the Vietnam War as many Americans had
thought. Writing about the 1970 demonstrations in the wake of Cambodia, Garfinkle argues that
they “were a sort of spontaneous conditioned reflex to an extraordinarily crisp and clear
escalation of the war in Southeast Asia and on campus. With a single exception, there was not
much in the way of large, nationally organized public protest thereafter, and it was not because
189
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of students’ fear of getting shot.” This “single exception” included rallies in late April 1971 in
Washington, DC. Various protest groups held events over multiple days, including Vietnam
Veterans Against the War led by their national spokesman and future Secretary of State John
Kerry. However, Garfinkle labels these April 1971 occurrences as otherwise “uneventful” and
attributes the ultimate decline of the movement to a combination of balkanization, administration
tactics, a poor economy, and the evolution of campus subcultures.191 Political scientist John
Mueller pushes even further, arguing that the protest movement was counterproductive.
“Opposition to the war in Vietnam came to be associated with rioting, disruption, and bomb
throwing, and war protesters, as a group, enjoyed negative popularity ratings to an almost
unparalleled degree.”192 This decline in the anti-war movement reflected a general lethargy
pervading the American public towards the Vietnam War.193
For as much as the Nixon administration focused on his messaging in the wake of the
negative media portrayals of Lam Son 719 in mid-March 1971, only 14% of the audience
watched the president’s 22 March interview with ABC’s Howard K. Smith. As these were the
days of only three television channels, the other 86% of viewers either watched a movie on NBC
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or a comedy special on CBS. Addressing this low viewership statistic, authors in Time described
Americans’ apathy toward the war at this point in 1971. “Long habit has ingrained a sort of
sullen skepticism about the war, an incredulity that is often oddly mixed with boredom.194 On 12
May 1971, David Derge, the president of polling firm Behavioral Research Associates, conveyed
to H.R. Haldeman that “those who have seen, heard, or read about President Nixon’s
appearances since March 1 vary from slightly more than half to three-fourths, which is lower
than it should be.” While a lower-than-desired number of Americans paid attention to the
president’s message, it was not for a lack of awareness of Lam Son 719. Derge wrote in another
memo to Haldeman on 25 March 1971 that “knowledge of the Laos incursion was high
(78%).”195 The indifference towards the war reflected in these low viewership numbers would be
consistent with Mueller’s empirical study of Gallup polls from both the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts. Mueller concluded that the longer a war dragged on, the less likely that Americans
were concerned about casualties. Mueller defined this relationship of time and disinterest by a
logarithm, writing, “While they did weary of the wars, they generally seem to have become
hardened to the wars’ costs: they are sensitive to relatively small losses in the early stages, but
only to large losses in later stages.”196
As evidenced by their detailed polling, the Nixon administration was highly sensitive to
public opinion, which would factor into policy decisions. Political scientists Benjamin Page and
Robert Shapiro compared polling data with actual troop levels in Vietnam from October 1969 to
December 1971 and discovered that “an additional 1% of people saying withdrawal was ‘too
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slow’ tended to be followed one month later by withdrawal of about 488 extra men for the
month.” The pair concluded, “Changes in public opinion apparently had a distinct impact on
policy, in this as in many other cases based on similar time series data.”197 Given his attention to
public opinion, the president would have considered the public’s reaction before embarking on
his strategy of calling Lam Son a triumph for Vietnamization and accelerating troop withdrawals.
He would have then calculated that an adequate proportion of the public would either believe
him or not care enough to inhibit that strategy’s progress.
In response to Hanoi’s “Easter Offensive,” an invasion of South Vietnam launched on 30
March 1972, Nixon authorized Operation Linebacker, the first sustained bombing campaign of
North Vietnam since 1968, which began on 9 May and lasted for six months. Shortly after
Nixon’s public address on 8 May 1972 announcing the beginning of Linebacker, he said to aides,
“The American people support the airstrikes. We polled the goddamn thing. They don’t give a
shit about negotiations. They don’t care. You realize that? They don’t care.”198 Whether or not
the American people truly cared about the bombing, Americans’ level of concern over Nixon’s
Vietnam policy did not prevent him from becoming re-elected by an unprecedented majority in
November 1972. Adam Garfinkle sums up the value of Nixon’s strategy: “Clearly, most people
did not care as much about how many Asians died in Southeast Asia as they did about the level
of U.S. ground combat participation and how many Americans died. Ending the draft and
punching the wind out of the antiwar movement on the one hand, and escalating the air war on
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the other, was a clever and effective White House tactic.”199 Also effective, and certainly helpful
to his re-election bid, were Nixon’s successes with China and the USSR.
Nixon and Kissinger’s communications through their secret channels to Beijing and
Moscow kept the incursion from derailing any diplomatic efforts with the two communist
powers. A growing rift between China and the Soviet Union also helped the United States in
these separate efforts.200 Nixon announced in a news conference on 17 February that Lam Son
was “not directed against Communist China,” and that he did not believe that Beijing had “any
reason to interpret this as a threat against them or any reason therefore to react.” This was in
response to a message received two weeks earlier from Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao
Guan Hua through Norway that the Chinese understood the American foreign policy of leaving
Vietnam and pivoting to China. In China and the Vietnam Wars, Qiang Zhai writes that “the
limited U.S. involvement in the Laotian invasion had indicated to the Chinese that Nixon did not
intend to reverse his policy of disengagement from Vietnam.” At the same time, China’s
continued support to North Vietnam, as exemplified by Zhou En Lai’s visit to Hanoi from 5 to 8
March 1971, was tempered by Zhou’s reticence to lead a Communist “worldwide People’s
Front” along with the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, as well as Beijing’s gentler criticism of
Lam Son 719 as compared to Cambodia the year before.201 Winston Lord later described the
president’s thinking during this time. “He thought if he opened China… the drama and the
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importance of dealing with the giant would put in perspective the rather messy exit from
Vietnam.”202
Nixon similarly kept Moscow at bay from overreacting to Operation Lam Son 719. While
the Laotian incursion was progressing, he and Kissinger continued pushing Soviet leaders
through their secret channel on the topics of West Berlin and SALT. Kissinger later described the
monopoly that his National Security Council held over negotiations with China and the USSR by
complaining that “it was tough on the nerves of the NSC staff, who had the sole responsibility of
backstopping three major negotiations [20 May SALT agreement, Berlin negotiations, and the
opening to China] simultaneously in the midst of the Laos operation.”203 Anatoly Dobrynin, the
Soviet ambassador to six Cold War American presidents including Nixon, recalled that in early
1971, the Politburo decided that it was in Russia’s “long-term interest to demonstrate the
possibility of a further development of Soviet-American relations in spite of their inherent
fluctuations,” and to become more “actively involved with Nixon.”204
A combination of these factors both within and outside of Nixon’s control allowed him to
climb out of the dire failures of March 1971 to achieve the successes of 1972. A key to this
transition was Nixon’s accurate reading of the pulse of the nation beginning with the tone of his
7 April 1971 television address. He gambled, correctly, that enough people would either believe
his case for Vietnamization or just not care. Had Watergate not dominated much of Nixon’s
second term both in practice and in historical memory, 1972 would have formed the plot of a
major political comeback story. Nonetheless, Nixon’s path from the operational failure of Lam
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Son 719 in mid-March 1971 to his public declaration of the success of Vietnamization on 7 April
1971 can provide some perspectives about presidential communications.
Firstly, the president correctly read his audience in 1971, which he failed to do in 1970.
The emotional state of the American people shifted greatly between 1970 and 1971. Nixon’s
recollection of the days in early May 1970 following the deaths at Kent State included a
conversation with Kissinger, in which he recalled his national security advisor stating, “I still
think you made the right decision…. But in view of what has happened I fear I may have failed
to advise you adequately of the domestic dangers.” Nixon acknowledged this failure to read his
public and anticipate the violent aftermath that resulted. Nixon wrote that he “assumed full
responsibility” and told Kissinger, “Don’t waste time rehashing things we can’t do anything
about.”205
Henry Kissinger realized in hindsight that the anti-war movement, which had been
dormant since the “silent majority” speech in November 1969, was ready to pounce by the
president’s 30 April 1970 speech announcing the Cambodian operation. Kissinger also
concluded that although the violence was likely unavoidable as “dialogue in our democracy had
broken down,” he believed that the media’s unfair criticism, which stirred up university students
around the United States, combined with the “excessive” rhetoric in Nixon’s speeches on
Cambodia, did little to help the situation. The president “played into the hands of his critics by
presenting an essentially defensive operation, limited in both time and space, as an earthshaking,
conscience-testing event, lending color to their claim that he had exceeded presidential authority
by ‘expanding’ the war,” Kissinger wrote. Although he always maintained that the Cambodian
operation was necessary from a military perspective, he felt that they quickly lost control of the
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debate; what should have been a reasonable discussion on tactics descended into an irrational
battle about morals.206
In contrast, Nixon’s speech on 7 April 1971 after the Laotian operation resulted in
marches on Washington by a declining anti-war movement, but nowhere near the level of
violence seen the year before. Nixon remarked to Kissinger on 30 March 1971, “On the Laotian
thing – that’s going to peter out. They’ll emote about that for a week or so then have the troop
announcement and then they’ll emote about that. Then eyes will go to the Congress, about what
they’ll do about it. It isn’t the public sentiment we’re talking about.”207 Incidentally, instead of
calling this 1971 speech, which avoided a detailed discussion of military tactics and pivoted to a
moral argument for the U.S. to stay in Vietnam, “excessive,” Kissinger wrote that Nixon’s line
about leaving in a way that gave South Vietnam “a reasonable chance to survive as a free
people” was “valid and central.”208 While the differences in public reaction from 1970 to 1971
resulted from many factors outside of Nixon’s control—including the Congressional restriction
on ground troops, a weakening anti-war movement, and increasing public indifference towards
the war—the way that the administration read this public sentiment and tailored its messaging
was crucial to their ability to accomplish policy goals.
The second perspective in presidential communication to be gained from this period is
the way the administration leveraged allies. As Nixon explained to Kissinger, “The main thing is
to mobilize all of our friends.”209 The president’s strengthening of U.S. bilateral relations with
the USSR and China helped to ensure that those countries would refrain from opposing the Laos
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incursion in 1971.210 At home, the Nixon team relied on surrogates both inside and outside of the
government. These allies would help push their narrative to the public by spreading the
administration’s latest Lam Son 719 talking points. President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Joint
Chiefs Chairman Thomas Moorer held multiple briefings for Republican members of Congress
on Laos between 18 March and 7 April 1971. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott and his fellow
Congressional Republicans promised Nixon’s congressional liaisons that they would “call into
the wires” after the 7 April speech.211 Kissinger maintained close contact with California
Governor Ronald Reagan, who visited the president in San Clemente a week before the
television address. Emphasizing the importance of maintaining these relationships, Nixon told
Kissinger, “You gotta have a Reagan out there hitting the ball.”212
Nixon’s team also relied on assistance from friends outside of the government, including
members of the media and public figures. In the three weeks between mid-March to early-April
1971, Kissinger had phone calls with Chuck Bailey of The Minneapolis Tribune, Henry Hubbard
of Newsweek, Marty Schramm of Newsday, liberal columnist Tom Braden, and conservative
columnist William Buckley. All of these calls displayed the personal intimacy of Kissinger’s
relationships with these media figures. In a more complicated interaction, on Nixon’s instruction,
Kissinger passed a publicly available report from General Abrams, which he portrayed to be an
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inside scoop, to NBC News anchor John Chancellor and Miami Herald reporter David Kraslow
at a lunch on 22 March.213 Other Nixon officials played a similar role, such as Ambassador to the
United Nations George H.W. Bush, who asked Kissinger for the latest Lam Son talking points to
respond to the editors of Newsweek after a lunch in New York.214
The administration’s circles extended into the fields of entertainment and religion and the
team was unafraid to use these connections to push policy also. In the days surrounding the 7
April speech, Henry Kissinger spoke with entertainer Bob Hope and both Nixon and Kissinger
had calls with televangelist and Christian leader Billy Graham. In Kissinger’s calls with both of
these public personalities, he pointed out specifics about Lam Son 719 such as destroying more
supplies than in Cambodia in 1970, setting the NVA back many months, keeping Hanoi from
major offensives in 1971, and achieving their political goals. He even told Hope that “the 150
tanks that [the NVA] had near Tchepone would have come to First Corps this year,” and that the
American and ARVN forces “destroyed 100,000 tons of supplies.”215 While this is certainly a
deeper level of military detail than most comedians like Hope would need to know, Kissinger
perhaps expected Hope to assist the administration in messaging beyond surface-level support.
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The third perspective one gleans from this period is Nixon’s focus on discrediting his
detractors. Journalist James Reston explained Nixon’s success in this area. “Tricky tactics
became common for a very simple reason: they worked. The voters didn’t like Communists and
they weren’t very hot on reporters either, so Nixon bashed both.”216 The hostile relationship
between the press and the Nixon administration began even before Nixon took office, and this
period from March to April 1971 was no different. In his 22 March television interview, Nixon
pointed to “philosophical difference” and different “vantage points” as the reason why he had
fewer supporters in the press than any president in the twentieth century. Although he used the
interview to highlight occasions where the media was incorrect, the president carefully pointed
out that he was not there to “bait the press,” that he was not claiming that press inaccuracies were
“deliberate or distorted,” nor was he complaining.217 Though vocal in his disdain for the press in
private, Nixon was careful in his public words, often delegating the public press bashing to other
administration members, especially Vice President Spiro Agnew.218 In a letter to all members of
Congress in late March 1971, NBC president Julian Goodman complained of White House
attempts to “interfere with the free flow of information” with “groundless attacks on television
journalism for partisan purposes.”219 In an unusual on-air editorial the same week, NBC
Anchorman John Chancellor declared, “Various people in the administration, including the
president and vice president, have been making nasty cracks about the TV coverage of the
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campaign in southern Laos…. We haven’t been able to tell the whole story because we haven’t
been allowed to.”220
Another target for disparagement were communists, both foreign and domestic. Journalist
and presidential researcher Ken Hughes calls Nixon “America's foremost anti-Communist
politician of the Cold War.” James Reston writes that Nixon was so successful in his crusade
against communism that “it became standard Republican strategy for a generation.” Nixon would
even combine these criticisms by labeling unfriendly journalists as communists.221 However, not
every attempt at denigration worked. During a visit to the Pentagon on 1 May 1970, the morning
after his address announcing the Cambodian operation, Nixon was recorded using the word
“bums” to describe campus protestors. He wrote later in his memoirs, “I was referring to the
arsonists at Berkeley and Yale and the Stanford firebombers and others like them…. Within a
few days, it was the widespread impression that I had referred to all student protesters as
‘bums.’” Kissinger threw a little more blame on his boss, writing that “the president’s
statements, oscillating between the maudlin and the strident, did not help in a volatile situation
where everything was capable of misinterpretation. His 1 May off-the-cuff reference to
‘bums…blowing up campuses,’ a gibe overheard by reporters during a visit to the Pentagon, was
a needless challenge, although it was intended to refer only to a tiny group of students who had
firebombed a building and burned the life’s research of a Stanford professor.”222
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Conclusion
While a picture “doesn’t lie,” the story that it tells depends upon the perspective of the
camera’s lens. Its narrative can vary widely depending on how near or far the photographer
zooms. An assessment of a historical event similarly depends upon the parameters of both time
and geography. As President Nixon said to Howard K. Smith about assessing Lam Son 719, “We
can only see it in perspective because its goals were long range.” Any evaluation of the success
or failure of the Nixon administration’s communication strategy after Lam Son 719 would also
depend on one’s limits of time and space. If Nixon’s goal was to withdraw U.S. troops and leave
behind a stable and sustainable South Vietnam, history would show that by April 1975, with
Communist forces toppling Saigon months after Nixon’s resignation from office, the American
effort had come up short. However, if his goal was to prevent a domestic backlash after Lam Son
719 resembling the level of violence and upheaval that occurred after Cambodia, the president
had succeeded. Even expanding Nixon’s goal to include gaining “enough political capital to
achieve diplomatic successes with China and the USSR and win re-election in 1972,” the
administration prevailed. It was this success that provides the greatest viewpoints in the
administration’s political messaging from 18 March to 7 April 1971.223
In hindsight, Operation Lam Son 719 was, at best, unable to achieve all of its goals. At
worst, it exemplified the failure of Vietnamization, precipitated the destruction of South
Vietnam, and showcased America’s defeat on the global stage. President Nixon continued to
maintain as late as 1990 that Lam Son 719, in conjunction with the operation in Cambodia to cut
“the flow of troops and arms from North Vietnam into South Vietnam,” had “enabled us to wind
223
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down our involvement in war.”224 Ultimately, Nixon remained loyal, at least in public, to his
assessment in 1978 that Lam Son was a “military success but a psychological defeat.”225 Melvin
Laird and Creighton Abrams remained similarly optimistic. In the only authorized biography of
Laird published in 2008, author Dale Van Atta writes that the former Secretary of Defense
believed “that the operation diverted the North for a period of time to reconstruct that portion of
the supply route.”226 General Abrams, who described Lam Son as the “largest battle of the war to
date,” considered the operation a “death blow” to Hanoi in August 1971.227
Others were more critical of the operation. Henry Kissinger wrote that Lam Son “fell far
short of our expectations,” and that the operation “clearly did not realize all our hopes; nor did it
fail completely.”228 Alexander Haig recalled, “It was clear to all, and especially to Nixon, that
the operation had gone wrong.”229 In its official post-operation assessment written around March
1972, MACV criticized ARVN “command and control,” blamed “strict security measures and
the close-hold nature of the plan” for the less-than-ideal execution from both the American and
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South Vietnamese militaries, and concluded that “Lam Son 719 did not lessen the North
Vietnamese intent to continue aggressive operations in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.”230
In their memoirs published in 1978 and 1979, both Nixon and Kissinger pointed to the
absence of a North Vietnamese attack for the remainder of 1971 and the South Vietnamese
ability to repel Hanoi’s Easter Offensive in 1972, however marginally, as evidence of the success
of Lam Son 719. “Thanks to Lam Son,” Nixon wrote, “there was no Communist offensive in
1971 despite the largest influx of materiel in the history of the war.” Kissinger echoed a similar
argument. “The combination of South Vietnamese ground forces and American air power,” he
recalled, “enabled us just barely to blunt the North Vietnamese offensive in 1972. Without the
attrition caused by the incursions into Laos and Cambodia, this would have been impossible. The
campaigns of 1970 and 1971, in my view, saved us in 1972.”231 MACV also took this view,
writing in its assessment that “Lam Son 719 might even have forestalled any major offensive
until the spring of 1972.”232
A common theme throughout these recollections is the negativity caused by press
coverage. Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig all saw the media’s reporting as selective, especially when
it came to the treatment of the ARVN retreat. All three pointed to the image of ARVN soldiers
clinging to helicopter skids as the most notable example of the media’s distortion having lasting
consequences. “It took only a few televised films,” Nixon wrote, “of ARVN soldiers clinging to
the skids of our evacuation helicopters to reinforce the widespread misconception of the ARVN
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forces as incompetent and cowardly.”233 Kissinger recalled that the ARVN “extracted themselves
in a tolerable fashion,” called the images of retreating ARVN “unedifying and untypical,” and
claimed that there was no way for the White House to give a balanced assessment as “those
pictures destroyed any such prospect, and Washington was so badly informed and the operation
deviated so much from the original plan that an alternative set of facts was not available in
time.”234 Even in 1992, Haig sided with his bosses, writing that “On the whole, it was an orderly
withdrawal, but television footage showed panicky ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of
American helicopters as the machines lifted out of the battle zone.”235
It turns out that a picture, while it does not lie, is also worth a thousand words. The image
of ARVN soldiers on helicopter skids came to define Operation Lam Son 719 for decades. Yet,
President Nixon would not allow this psychological and public relations failure to become a
political one. By campaigning, and winning, in 1968 on a promise to “end the war and win peace
in the Pacific” by helping South Vietnam “fight the war and not fight it for them,” Nixon locked
his administration on the path of withdrawal from the first day of his presidency.236 By March
1971, one month into Lam Son 719, Nixon had to consider his strategy for re-election in 1972,
possibly against Senator Ted Kennedy.237 Nixon also contended with a domestic anti-war
movement enflamed by the campus violence of 1970 and a Congress increasingly less supportive
by the day. He had plans for historic diplomatic breakthroughs with China and the Soviet Union.
The way to achieve success in those areas was to exit Vietnam as soon as possible, no matter the
result of Lam Son 719. Fortunately, the American public agreed.
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Weeks before Nixon’s 7 April address, many in the media predicted that the president
would announce an acceleration in troop withdrawals regardless of the ARVN’s performance in
Lam Son.238 It was simply a balancing of competing interests, namely President Thieu’s
reelection bid in October 1971, which compelled the president to decide on the figure of 100,000
troops by 1 December 1971. However, while Nixon may have accepted privately that Lam Son
719 was a lost cause, saying things like “if it fails, it fails” to Kissinger, he had to maintain
optimism in public with lines like “leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable
chance to survive” in his address.239 Yet, some of those journalists who correctly predicted that
the president would pull out more troops from South Vietnam despite bad news from Laos were
incorrect in their second prediction—that the American people would object enough for Nixon to
lose re-election.240 At least some credit for preventing the second prediction from coming to
fruition goes to the administration’s public messaging.
The path from failure on 18 March to announcing success on 7 April was not a natural
one, but one carved deliberately by Nixon, his White House team, and their surrogates inside and
outside of government. With the president’s television appearances on 22 March and 7 April, the
238
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administration redirected the narrative by redefining success from military victory to fulfilling a
moral duty and by extending the boundaries of the debate from the borders of Laos to freedom
around the world. Unlike Cambodia the year before, this strategy worked in 1971 because Nixon
correctly read the public opinion landscape and told a war-weary American people what they
wanted to hear.
James Reston wrote in his 1991 memoirs about his reluctance to write about the Vietnam
War once more. “From first to last, I felt that war involved so many lies, cost so many lives,
divided so many friends, and raised so many questions about the judgment of our officials that I
hated to think about raking through the rubble one last time.”241 The war left a legacy upon
American, Vietnamese, and Southeast Asian societies that can be felt to this day. The way that
Americans now question the morality of foreign policy decisions, America’s role in the world,
and the credibility of news is, in large part, because of Vietnam. However, by looking at this
period of the war from 18 March to 7 April 1971, another legacy emerges—one of presidential
communications.
This legacy upon American society is perhaps just as indelible. President Nixon’s actions
after Lam Son 719 showed that failure could be spun into success. Just because the media
repeated its refrain that Lam Son 719 was a failure for Vietnamization, the Nixon White House
overcame that obstacle through deliberate and effective messaging to the American people and
strategic outreach to China and the Soviet Union, all with assistance from increasing public
indifference to the war. Before his 7 April speech, President Nixon told Henry Kissinger,
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“People don’t want to hear about sorrow so much.” 242 So Nixon stopped talking about sorrow.
And then, so did the American people.
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